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ABSTRACT
This study inquires into the reasons for the onset of three
arms control negotiations; the Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907
(considered one continuing conference), the Washington Naval Conference
of 1921-1922 and SALT I. Of special interest is the role of qualita
tive changes in weaponry. Attention is focused on the periods
immediately preceding each conference in order to identify qualitative
changes in weaponry which appeared to be of concern to major partici
pants.- Next, each conference itself is examined to determine if such
weapon innovations were important in the context of the conference.
Finally, the conferences are compared to determine similarities and
differences in the reasons for the onset of each conference.
The results suggest that whereas no single factor or group of
factors can be said to always be present to provide the impetus for
arms control negotiations, it can be stated that three factors,
economics, security, and technological innovations in weaponry, provide
the prime determinants for most.

v

WEAPONS INNOVATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL
Three Case Studies

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Certain subjects seem quite clear as long as
we leave them alone. The answers look obvious
until we ask questions, the concepts appear to
be well understood until we wish to define them,
causes and effects are easily recognized until
we seek to explain them, and all the rules pass
for valid until we try to prove them.-1Such is true with arms control and disarmament.

The subject has been

bandied about over many decades so that a large amount of "conventional
wisdom" has emerged to enshroud the topic and thus confuse certain
issues, among them the reasons for arms control conferences.
This study will inquire into reasons for the onset of three sets
of arms control negotiations:

the Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907 >

the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, and SALT I (the phase of the
strategic arms limitation talks of 1969-1972).

Of special interest

will be the role of qualitative changes in weaponry.

Attention will

be focused on the periods immediately preceding each conference in
order to identify qualitative changes in weaponry which appear to be of
concern to major participants.

Next, each conference itself will be

examined to determine if such weapon innovations were important in the
context of the conference.

Finally, the conferences will be compared

to determine similarities and differences in the reasons for the onset
of each conference.
1
f
Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper &
Row, 19614.), p. 1.

2

A frequent assumption throughout history was that armaments
cause wars; therefore, to halt wars, armaments must, by definition,
be abolished, or controlled to a significant degree.

Qualitative

changes, or improvements in weaponry, appeared to widen the effect of
these armaments so as to multiply their destructiveness.
at the evolution of weaponry will show this as true.

A brief look

As the weapons

of war changed from the feudal horse soldiers to bows and arrows, the
crossbow, the various stages of muskets and rifles— flintlocks, repeaters,
machine guns, automatic handguns— to tanks, ships, artillery, airplanes—
and finally to nuclear weapons— war became more of a deadly affair,
affecting more people.

As Charles A. Barker aptly states; "War-has

always been limited by the capacity of a nation to organize its
military and apply it with political effect.

The limitations of

weaponry . . . entered the calculations of the prosecutors of war."

2

As the destructiveness of weaponry through its qualitative changes
increased, however, men appear to have more earnestly sought means by
which to limit this weaponry or its deployment.
The first really successful negotiation of this type culminated
in the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817. The negotiation was between the
United States and Great Britain, and concerned the question of arma
ments, especially naval armaments, along the common border of America
and British North America.

Agreements were reached which limited both

sides to one armed vessel each on Lakes Champlain and Ontario, and two
each on Lakes Erie, Huron, Michigan and Superior.

Each armed ship was

limited to one 18 pound gun.
2
Charles A. Barker, "Disarmament; a Problem of Time," in
Problems of World Disarmament, coordinated by Charles A. Barker (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co.71963)> P• 9*

3

Little else concerning arms control and disarmament was attempted,
however, until the advent of the Hague Conferences of 1899

190?;

hut these negotiations failed to halt armament production or improvement
in any hut very minor ways.

After World War I, however, certain

maritime nations appeared to experience a revulsion against large-scale
armament production, especially in the area of naval weaponry, and came
together at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 in order to limit
this type of weaponry.

This conference culminated in 1922 with an

agreement which established ceilings on production of certain kinds of
naval warships, in the form of ratios for the United States, Great
Britain, Japan, Prance and Italy.

Following this, other attempts were

made to halt armaments.
In 1930 the London Naval Conference managed several minor limits
on battle cruisers and submarines.

Following this, in the World

Disarmament Conference of 1932, President Hoover proposed that all
armaments which could be used for offense be forbidden, but this
request failed.

Hoover then suggested that a 30 percent reduction in

armaments across the board be made by all nations attending the

conference, but this was rejected by France.

Following this, in 1933>

Germany withdrew from the conference, thus in effect ending any chance
to reach any agreement at all.

Next, in December 193i+j Japan decided

to withdraw from the Washington Treaty, and submitted its formal notice
of termination.

As Barker says, ’’the disarmament effort following

World War I withered and died under the heat of these events.”3
By the end of World War II, the scope of weapon innovations in
the form of atomic weapons had further enlarged the destructive

3Ibid.

capability of armaments.

From 1 3 k S i half-hearted attempts by the

camps of the East and West toward disarmament were undertaken, but
ideological differences and repeated qualitative jumps in weaponry made
the nuclear nations very skeptical and suspicious of each other.

It

was not until the early 1960's that disarmament began to be sought
earnestly by the nuclear nations, especially the United States and
the Soviet Union, and peripheral agreements to the main topic of arms
control began to proliferate.

Finally in 19&9 the United States and

Russia began the so-called SALT negotiations.

Phase I ended in 1972

with an agreement on limitation of certain defensive missiles,, and a
temporary ceiling on certain types of offensive weaponry.
Thus, the twentieth century saw an increase in the efforts of
nations, mostly as the improvement in quality of weaponry began to
insure more destructiveness in war, to reach some sort of agreement on
arms control.

The majority of writings on arms control, however, show

very little, if any, concern about the reasons for the onset of these
arms control negotiations.
made.

Practically nowhere are valid generalizations

The only attempts made to explain the ’’why11 have come in the

manner of "conventional wisdom" assertions; for example, assumptions
attributing them to the effects of economics, morality, good will or
public opinion.

While these may be valid explanations, no steps have

been taken to determine their effects.
Moreover, the fact of the matter appears to be that the great
concern with arms control is in reality a post-World War II phenomenon,
and studies on the subject have appeared to evolve around the technical
considerations of nuclear armaments and ways to conduct mutual
inspections.

Historical studies of the factors influencing the onset of

arms control negotiations are few, and studies attempting to generalize
are nonexistent.
ground.

This paper, then, is to tread on relatively unbroken

For that reason, this inquiry is done cautiously, with broad-

based descriptions of the conferences and the preceding periods in an
attempt to examine, briefly, all the reasons for arms control which
appear especially applicable. This inquiry will necessarily observe
other factors than solely weapon innovations, even if no more than just
to acknowledge their existence and their possible effect.

The advances

in weaponry, on the other hand, will be examined in more detail.

In

the final analysis, however, it is doubtful thati at this stage, any
positive, concrete relationships of weapon innovations and arms control
can be ascertained.

However, if this inquiry serves to focus on certain

reasons for the onset of negotiations and is able to generate hypotheses
concerning weaponry which may be explored at a later time, then the
thesis has served its purpose.
These three conferences were specifically chosen because they
are generally recognized as representative of the efforts at arms
control in this century.

The Hague Conferences, for example, took

place at the head of a cycle of arms control negotiations.

Before

these, very little had been done to gain arms control, because it was
not seen as a viable possibility.

We can even ask if the Hague

Conferences were, in reality, disarmament conferences; but it is
generally recognized that the 1899 conference was at least conceived
of as such, and nations gathered together knowing they would speak of
armaments.

The Washington Conference is generally seen as the only

successful pre-World War II arms control conference, involving fewer
nations than Hague but more than SALT.

It was the first such

conference in the interwar period, and it laid the groundwork for those
which were to follow.
concept.

SALT, on the other hand, is an entirely new

It directly involved only two nations, but literally involved

the world.

It came at a time when technological innovation was at

its highest peak.

It is currently the subject of intense debate, and

arms control "experts” constantly attempt to generalize from this
conference.
Before beginning the studies, however, it is necessary to
clarify the terminology which will be used.

The singular term

"disarmament" has been used intermittently to represent any of three
basic ideas:

the total abolition of armaments, the absence of increases

in armaments in general or in particular, or the reduction of armaments
in general or in particular.
to cover several ideas.

Likewise, "arms control" has. been used

For example, Bernard Brodie says that arms

control "includes disarmament, arms limitation, and specific guidance
of future development."^

Thomas Larson suggests that disarmament be

"used to refer to measures envisaging the reduction or elimination of
armaments or armed forces"; and that arms control or arms limitation be
used interchangeably to represent "measures envisaging other kinds
of limitations."

Others take arms control out of its historical

context and use it to represent a certain idea, such as "steps aimed at
reducing the risk of accidental, inadvertent, or miscalculated war, or
^Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York:
1973), p. 32i|*

Macmillan Co. ,

^Thomas B. Larson, Disarmament and Soviet Policy, 1961+--1968
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J,: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. I*.

at reducing the frightfulness of nuclear

wee

6
if it should break out.”

John W. Spanier says that "disarmament refers to the complete abolition
or partial reduction of the human and material resources of war. . .

7

These definitions combine to confuse, rather than to amplify.
IMs study will use, as a point of clarification, the definitions
presented by Merze Tate in The Disarmament Illusion. Disarmament, then,
is 11the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with
domestic safety— which implies sufficient arms not only for internal
policing but for the protection of territory against invasion.” In
sum, this is not to "lay down your arms,” but rather the "limitation
and reduction of armaments,” and thus is a political problem.

Limita

tion is the "abstention from increase of armaments,” and reduction is
8
"the general and simultaneous decrease or curtailment of armaments.”
Any other nuances will be defined where they appear.
then, means any and all of the above:

"Arms control,"

disarmament, arms limitation,

and arms reduction.
Weaponry refers to the actual armaments, land, sea, or air,
which can be used in combat, either for defense of one’s own possessions,
or offensively against another nation in order to gain influence or
possessions.

Most will have a dual purpose:

offense and defense.

Qualitative innovations in weaponry are those improvements made in
6
Lincoln P. Bloomfield et al., Khmshchev and the Arms Race:
Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disamament, 195L-196U (Cambridge,
Mass. : m ] I. T. Press, 1966) , p. 1, Fn. 1.
7John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee, The Politics of Disarma
ment; A,.Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship ("New York: Praeger, 1962) ,
:p* 5.
8
Merze Tate, The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a
Limitation of Armaments to 1 9Q7(New York: Russell & Russell, 1971,
cT9^2y7ppTi^"x7^

8

weapons of such a nature so as to alter in some major way the then
established manner of making war.

In a word, these are changes which

increase the "destructive potential of existing and follow-on systems" 9
so as to create concern in a nation not having this innovation.
The terms arms control "conference" and "negotiation" will be
used interchangeably to mean "a process in which explicit proposals
are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an
exchange or on the realization of a common interest. . . . "

These

proposals are not part of "tacit bargaining," but rather deal with such
items as the agenda, rules, and technical and legal issues.

Negotiations,

in this sense* are needed anytime "explicit agreement is essential.
^John Newhouse, Cold Dawn;
Rinehart & Winston, 1973)> P* 3«
10Ikle, pp. 3-1+.

The Story of SALT (New York: Holt,

CHAPTER II

THE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907
The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were the result of a
series of events, fears, and perceptions which had taken place in the
last decades of the nineteenth century.

The direct "antecedent act"

was the Rescript of Czar Nicholas II which called for the nations
of the world to meet at a conference in order to discuss ways which
would hopefully lead to a lessening of the "arms race" then in effect.
This original intent of the Rescipt was subsequently broadened to
include other concerns, specifically international arbitration, and the
first conference at the Hague began on May 18, 1899 • These conferences
did show that some topics could be discussed amenably with hope of agree
ment, but also that certain topics were not negotiable.

If these

latter topics were broached, a chorus quickly arose to render any
discussion unproductive.

As a result of the intransigence of several

of the nations represented at the Hague, very little in the way of
agreement on disarmament was reached.

In the second conference the

subject was even rejected as part of the formal program, and only
peripheral agreements concerning the use of armaments were reached.
In the period preceding the conferences, the philosophy of most
European nations appeared to be "if you wish for peace, you must prepare
for war."'*" Bismark, for one, took this statement so seriously that he

^William I. Hull, The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contributions
to International Law (boston: Ginn & Co., 1908; reprint ed., New York:
Kraus Reprint Co., 1970)5 P* 52.
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converted Prussia and Germany into what has been described as a "modem
Sparta."

Other nations followed his lead to such an extent that, as

William I. Hull, a noted expert on the conferences, stated, the "armed
peace" became more of a burden than actual war had been before.

This

armed peace manifested itself in intense suspicion between nations.
What may have been defensive moves by one nation, appeared as highly
offensive to others.

For example, on December 6, 1898, the Kaiser

announced a request to the Reichstag for an increase in the army of
26,576 men.

This was necessitated, he said, because of the unfortunate

geographical position of Germany.

Since Germany’s neighbors were

increasing armaments and military expenditures at a very rapid rate,
the vulnerability of her two exposed fronts caused much concern.

This

-increase in German troops, on the other hand, appeared to provide the
"Austrian militarists" with a reason to clamor for increases in their
armaments, which they did.

In sum, as tensions became more intense

toward the end of the century, alliances formed and military men
prepared for war.^
As a response to this, peace societies became louder in their
condemnation of war preparations.

Also, many nations began to feel

the economic pinch created by channeling large amounts of their national
economic wealth into arms production.

Because governments saw great

utility in a militaristic posture, however, the onus was on those who
proposed disarmament to show how it would benefit all.

Since the peace

movement after 1850 (the Universal Peace Congress, the churches, the
Arbitration Alliance), could not convince governments to take action
Sferze Tate, The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a
Limitation of Armaments t o 1907 (Hew^oikl Russell & Russell, 1971»
pp. 252-56.

11

against armaments, another force had to provide the impetus to get the
3
nations to a disarmament conference.
This is not to imply, however, that the peace movement had no
effect on the creation of the conferences at the Hague.

The fact of

the matter is, according to Merze Tate, an expert on disarmament
conferences, that these peace societies did play some part in the
eventual conferences, hut it was not an overt role.

Rather, it was a

covert process which served to educate the publics of the various
nations to a sense of their responsibilities.

The peace groups were

faced, however, with a massive effort on the part of government to
maintain adequate defense capabilities.

They attempted to convince

their publics that it was impossible for them to limit armaments while
neighboring states were increasing theirs.

This ploy by the govern

ments was successful, and the publics in most nations began to see
disarmament as a "utopian dream.
"In short," Tate argues, "in 1898 there existed in England, the
United States, and to a lesser extent in France and Germany, an inchoate
opinion in favor of a limitation of armaments, but this opinion did
not exert a great influence upon governments.

At the close of the

century it was beginning to affect statesmen only in what they said,
not in what they did."

The impetus for the top decision makers of the

various nations, the kings, diplomats, emperors, presidents, etc., to
finally begin to seriously consider a limitation in armaments resulted
3Ibid., p. 160.
^Ibid., pp. I6O-63.
% b i d . , p. 163.

12
not from public opinion, but primarily from budgets which became
unmanageable in peacetime.

They also became fearful of other things:

the terror and hazards of war, internal revolution and "economic and
political convulsions" in the social order— anything which might cause
their downfall.

Nevertheless, there was no movement towards a

disarmament conference.

They seemed content to live with their fears

because of the thought, perhaps unconscious in some cases, that to
reduce armaments might dangerously increase their vulnerability.

6

Ironically, a proposal for a conference to discuss disarmament
came from what Tate describes as, "a country where even pacifist opinion
on the subject was only in a nascent form and still inarticulate, where
all peace propaganda was carefully censored and where no Peace Society
existed."

7

This was the Rescript from Czar Nicholas II of Russia.

8

The reason for the Rescript, says Hull, was that the Czar and
his advisors recognized the immense costs involved in keeping their
army and navy at a quality and quantity equal to, or better than, the
other major nations of the world, especially in Europe.

The actual

idea for the Rescript, according to Hull, came from an attempt by the
Minister of War, General Alexie N. Kuropatkin, Finance Minister Count
Witte, and Foreign Minister Count Muraviev, "to avoid the necessity of
replacing an antiquated kind of artillery by a new and expensive one." 9
£
Calvin Davis, The United States and the First Hague Peace
Conference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 16-30.
7Tate, p. I63. According to Hull, p. 2, Russia at this time
was considered the "world’s largest military power."
8
A Rescript, as defined in Webster, is "an official or authorita
tive order, decree, or formal announcement." Webster’s Third New Interna
tional Dictionary of the English Language 3<i Ed. (l969)> s. v. "Rescript."
^Hull, p. 2.

13

Calvin Davis, the author of The United States and the First
Hague Peace Conference, agrees that Kuropatkin instigated the Rescript.
It appears that Kuropatkin was very concerned over a relatively new
qualitative advance in weaponry:

a rapid-fire field gun which was

reported to be capable of firing six rounds per minute, as compared to
the one round per minute field guns then in existence.

His concern

heightened when he learned that the Austro-Hungarian Army was to
acquire a number of these new weapons, which Both Prance and Germany
already had.

The problem faced by Kuropatkin was that if Russia was

to join the armaments competition concerning these guns, it would cost
approximately fifty million dollars, which the Russian treasury did not
have.

He also felt that loans would be impossible to obtain.^
Miss Tate’s story, taken from the diary of E. J. Dillon,^

differs only slightly from the above.

It appears that the minister of

the Marine, Admiral Grigorsvitch, requested a loan from the Czar for
the reconstruction of the naval fleet; primarily because Germany was
exceeding Russia in terms of naval strength.

The Czar initially

declined, but later partially gave in and authorized an amount of money
for this purpose.

Eight days later General Kuropatkin requested that

the Czar authorize a national loan for the purchase of new firearms, and
for the refurbishment of the Russian army along the same lines as then
existed in France.

The Czar declined this request, but Kuropatkin

argued that intelligence reports indicated that Germany was becoming
■^Davis, p. 1+3.
■^Dr. E. J. Dillon enjoyed an intimate friendship with Count Witte.
He had lived in Russia under three Czars, had graduated from two Russian
Universities, wrote for two Russian newspapers, and was Professor of
Comparative Philosophy at the University of Kharkov.

Ik
too powerful and should be feared.

He also pointed out that under a

military convention which she had signed with France, Russia was
obligated to retain a common system of weaponry with her ally.

The

Czar replied that he would consult with Count Muraviev to see what
could be done to avoid this kind of expenditure.

12

It was at this point that the influence of Nicholas1 advisors
come into the picture, for it was they who actually wrote the Rescript.
Their motives appear different from the Czar's, however.

They saw

that "Russia needed peace for consolidating her new territorial
acquisitions, for improving her economic and financial system, for the
completion of her strategic railways and canals and for carrying out
her new naval program." 13 Any respite in the competition for armaments
would be an advantage to Russia.
The ministers to the Czar, in particular Count Witte, were
certain that weakness and disunity of Russia would mean that any conflict
with Germany would probably result in disintegration of Russia.
regard, all wars must be avoided and peace sought.

In this

Peace would have

the effect, and be a prerequisite for, the stabilization and regenera
tion of a solid financial base for Russia.^
What appeared as the final push for Russian initiation of the
Rescript, according to Tate and Dillon, 1E> was Kuropatkin relating to
Muraviev that Austria-Hungary was on the verge of increasing and
12Tate, p. 179.

13Ibid., p. 182.

1TEbicL , pp. I8J4.-87.
The following is largely from Merze Tate and E. J. Dillon,
The Eclipse of Russia (London: Curtus Brown, 1918). Davis echoes it to
some extent, but rests his argument more on the military effects of the
field gun.

15

replacing her artillery -weapons.

If she did so, thought Kuropatkin,

Russia would have to do likewise. Kuropatkin's idea was that Russia
propose to Austria that some form of compromise he reached between the
two for the elimination of the excessive burden of refitting for
artillery.

This proposal was to be for a temporary period of ten years.

Count Witte, when informed of this plan by Muraviev, was in
disagreement.

He believed this arrangement would only serve to inform

Austria and Germany that Russia

was in financial straits, which would

definitely not be in Russia's best interest.

What Witte proposed was a

"ruse" to be used to convince Austria that disarmament should be
discussed.

He envisioned the development of a group of pacific nations

in competition with each other over trade, science, and industry.

To

make this a reality, thought Witte, the nations should begin to think
in these terms.

What should be proposed, he suggested, was a plan to

bring all of the major nations in the world together at a conference.

16

If the above explanation for the origination of the Rescript
is accepted, says Tate, then the conclusion which has to be reached is
that the Rescript was not brought about through "idealistic motives,"
but that it was conceived by Witte and Muraviev.as an attempt to help
17
Russia out of her extreme financial difficulties.
As E. J. Dillon
states:
There would in all probability have been no
Hague conference if General Kuropatkin had
asked in the ordinary way for the necessary
credit to enable him to follow the example of
his German colleague and supply the Russian
Dillon, pp. 270-79.
17Tate, p. 195.

army with a new gun. It is equally probable
that if Witte had simply accepted or rejected
the War minister’s suggestion of a ’deal* with
Austria, the peace conference would not have
been convoked or thought of. . . . However
high we may rate the contributory causes of the
peace movement inaugurated by Nicholas II,
history will retain the decisive fact that the
motive of its prime author [Witte] was to
hoodwink the Austrian Government and to enable
the Tsar’s War Minister to steal a march on
his country’s future enemies.
Davis also sums it in this light.

He says that "the truth was that the

peace rescript had been conceived in fear, brought forth in deceit, and
swaddled in humanitarian ideals.”19
The Rescript, which acquired the name the Czar’s Rescript, was
formally issued on August 27, 1898. It said that:
The maintenance of universal peace and a
possible reduction of the excessive armaments .
which weigh upon all nations represent, in
the present conditions of affairs all over the
world, the ideal towards which the efforts of
all governments should be directed.20
It further stated that the time was ripe for a discussion of this
problem on an international scale.

It also made reference to the

movements and opinions directed towards peace in the preceding decades,
and alluded to efforts of governments toward entering into alliances,
and strengthening their military forces for peace.

It finally pointed

out that these efforts had not brought peace.
Next, the Rescript spoke of the financial burden undergone by
the various nations of the world because of the development of their
Dillon, p. 278.
19
^Davis, p. 1+3•
20
I use the Rescript as quoted in Tate, pp. 167-69*

17

military forces and the role of technology in improving their weapons.
It said:
Hundreds of millions are spent in acquiring
terrible engines of destruction which are
regarded to-day as the latest inventions of
science, hut are destined to-morrow to he
rendered obsolete by some new discovery.
National cultural, economical progress, and
the production of wealth are either paralysed
or developed in a wrong direction. . . . The
constant danger involved in this accumulation
of war material renders the armed peace of
to-day a crushing burden more and more diffi
cult for the nations to b e a r . ^1
The Rescript went on and said that if this burden increased, then
disaster could be the only result.

Thus,the Rescript called for a

limitation on the increase of armaments through the convocation of a
conference to take up this question.

It was signed by Count Muraviev.

Copies of the Rescript were given to all foreign ambassadors
.then in Russia.
conference
armaments.

Muraviev expressed the

Czar? s reason for such a

as a desire to open hearings on halting all increasesof
In clarification he said that armaments in existence would

be allowed to remain, and no political questions would be discussed.
Because of Russia's vast military forces the Rescript surprised the
diplomats,.conservatively speaking, and the reactions evoked were
22

generally of a suspicious nature.

In the United States the Rescript elicited a divided opinion.
One group believed that the Czar feared "rapprochement of England and
America and [the] appearance of the United States in the Far East."^
Another group believed that the Czar was not concerned with the armaments
21
Ibid.
23Ibid., p. 38.

22
Davis, p. 39.

of the United Utates at all, and, therefore, the cry for a limitation
on armaments was of no concern to them.
t

In any regard, since at the

.»

time the United States was in a war with Spain and rapidly increasing
armaments, it consequently saw that a conference concerning armaments
was essentially impractical.

The United States decided to attend the

proposed conference, but let it be known beforehand that it would not
limit arms.^
Russia was surprisingly skeptical herself.

She quickly let it

be known that decisions made at the conference would not be binding;
but the Czar, at a minimum, hoped to establish some commission which
would insure that discussion of armaments would continue.

He and his

advisors were especially concerned because Russia had no industry to
speak of:

especially an armaments industry.

Thus Russia was forced to

purchase all powders and armaments abroad, thereby contributing to the
drain on her financial resources.
Germany appeared to be outwardly agreeable, but privately
skeptical.

The Kaiser was the first to react to the Rescript, and did

so by sending a telegram to the Czar saying, diplomatically, that
Russian motives were good and "pure,'1 but the idea of a general disarma
ment was not in itself a simple scheme, but rather very complex and
difficult.

He did not reject the Rescript out of hand, but said that it

would be studied.
In essence, Germany felt nothing of much value would come from
the conference since, having to defend two frontiers, any limitation
^Ibid. , p.
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of armaments was seen as placing her at an extreme disadvantage with
her neighbors.

The Kaiser thought that Russia’s financial difficulties

accounted for the Rescript, and that since Russia could no longer obtain
money from Prance (the Russian debt to Prance had reached large propor
tions), she was attempting to obtain loans from England and Germany by
means of a facade of pacifism.

But to reject the Rescript out of

hand, thought the Kaiser, might cause other nations to blame Germany for
scuttling a chance for peace in the world.

26

Two letters from the Kaiser reveal the above as probably true.
In one he states:
The whole plan seems to me to be due merely to
the financial exhaustion of Russia . . . .
Taxes
: can hardly be increased, and culture is at the
lowest ebb. Witte had no further [financial]
sources, since Prance has given Out and Germany
and England are no longer willing. Whereby it is
clearly proven that so far Europe has paid for
the Russian armaments. All this must be counted
in, along, with the young Tsar’s humanitarian
nonsense which has led him to this incredible
step. There’s a bit of deviltry in it too,
because any one who refuses the invitation will
be sard to want to break the peace and that at a
moment when Russia cannot go further, while
others— especially Germany— -can now begin and
make up for lost time.^7
In another letter, speaking of Muraviev and Witte, he said:
The vanity of the former was tickled by the idea
of presiding over a conference, and thus having
the opportunity of bringing himself into promi
nence and getting himself talked about, a consid
eration which influenced most of his actions, and
the latter was in a serious want of money, and
thought that the proclamation of a pacific policy
96
Tate, pp. 250-51.
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Die Grosse Politik, XV, Wo. 1+219, PP* 11+9-50. Prince von Bulow
to Kaiser William II, August 28, 1898, quoted in Tate, p. 252.

would open for him the money markets of
London and Berlin, which had now become a
matter of vital necessity, since he had
lost all hope of receiving further supplies
from France. °
The British view of armaments appears best expressed by a
statement made in the House of Commons in 1899 "by George J, Goschen, the
first Lord of the Admiralty, when he declared that the British would re
duce naval constuction if other leading naval powers would do likewise,
Britain, however, was the only major power to make this gesture.
any regard, the British remained skeptical of a conference.
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In

Lord

Salisbury, the Prime Minister, had. been concerned about armament
increases for some time, but he saw no solution which would lead to a
halt in these increases, or any reduction.

He accepted the Russian

invitation, but reasoned that until others reduced their armaments,
England could not.
Tate states that, although he had been concerned over armament
increases, Lord Salisbury
was far from sure that a reduction was
desirable even if the powers were to agree
to a scheme.. Although its immediately
[sic] effect might be to decrease the
burdens of taxation, it would, at the same
time, rob war of some of its terrors, and
thus add a new peril to those threatening
the general peace. He was of opinion [sic]
that no peace is possible in Europe without
an armed force behind it, . . . He believed
that the perfection of the instruments of
warfare, their extreme costliness, and the
horrible carnage and destruction which would
accompany their employment on a large scale
28

G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, British Documents on the
Origin of the War, l898-1911+> vol. I. (London, 1927) > p T~ 22 2 ~ 9
Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury, Berlin, December 22, 1898,
quoted in Tate, p. 25>2.
^Lavis, p. 81+.

acted as a serious deterrent from war;
armaments were so adjusted as to render a
successful war not worth s t r i v i n g for.30
France was initially cold hut polite toward the Rescript.

Due

to its previous close contacts with Russia, France was initially offended
by not being consulted by the Czar before he issued the Rescript.
France was

convinced ofthe infeasibility of arms limitation for itself,

but went along because it did not want to be accused as being the one
responsible for obstructing the conference. 31

France^ real feelings

appear to be recorded in a letter to Count Munster of Germany from
S
'4
/
foreign Minister Theophile Delcasse of France. Delcasse said:
In this conference we have entirely the same
interest as you. You will not limit your
forces at this moment nor agree to proposals
of disarmament, we are in the same position.
On both sides we wish to spare the Tsar and
to find a formula to circumvent this question;
but we will not let ourselves in for anything
which might weaken our forces on either side.
But to avoid a complete fiasco we may possibly
be able to make a few concessions about arbi
tration. But these must not in any case limit
the full independence of the g r e a t S t a t e s . 32
Italy, on the other hand, was very interested in reduction of
budgets, while Turkey was not interested in disarmament at all.

Japan

acknowledged that due to heavy expenditures for both its army and navy,
it was anxious for the conference.
The reaction of the mass media to the Rescript was at first
cautious but, by and large, sympathetic to the humanitarian interests
shown by the Czar.

From this, however, the media soon turned to ridicule

^Tate, p. 2^9-

*^Davis, p. 89.

~^Die Grosse Politik, XV~, Ho. 1+253, p. 186, Count Munster to
Prince von Hohenloke, Paris, April 21, 1899> quoted in Tate, p. 256.

and skepticism.

It saw that Russia was in a financial "bind, and was

therefore promoting a conference on limiting arms primarily hecau.se the
Czar lacked the money for purchase of armaments.

The media further

questioned the viability of the Czar’s proposal for a disarmament
conference at the same time he was refurbishing his armed forces.
Due to the tremendous amount of skepticism resulting from the
original Rescript, Czar Nicholas II and his ministers made an effort to
ameliorate what seemed to be the artificially altruistic motives of the
Rescript by issuing a second notice, or circular, which considerably
broadened the scope.of the original.

The question of disarmament was

ma<le subordinate to other problems and proposals, for example, arbitra
tion; and this modification was better received.
This second proposal contained the following: 33
1. An understanding stipulating the non increase,
for a definite period, of the present effective
military and naval forces, and also of the
military budgets pertaining to them; and a
_ preliminary investigation of the means by which
even a reduction in these forces and budgets
may be secured in the future.
2. A prohibition of the introduction, in armies
and navies, of any new kinds of firearms whatso
ever, as well as of new explosives or any
powders more powerful than those now in use,
either for muskets or for cannon.
3. A restriction of the use, in military
campaigns, of the formidable explosives already
existing; and a prohibition of the hurling of
projectiles or explosives of any kind from
balloons or by analogous means.
1|. A prohibition of the use, in naval warfare,
of submarine torpedo boats or plungers, or of
33James Brown Scott, The Work of the Second Hague Conference
(New York: American Assn. for International Conciliation, 1908),
pp. i|5-U6. A slightly different translation can be found in Davis,
pp. Ill, 112, 115, 120, and in Tate, pp. 267-69.
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other similar engines of destruction; and
an agreement not to construct in the future
war vessels with rams.
5. The application to naval warfare of the
stipulation of the Geneva Convention of l86i|.,
on the basis of the additional articles of
1868.
6. The neutralization of ships or boats
employed in saving those overboard during or
after naval battles.
7. A revision of the Declaration concerning
the laws and customs of war, elaborated in
I87I4.by the Conference of Brussels and
remaining unratified to the present day.
8. The acceptance, in principle, of the
employment of good offices, of mediation and of
facultative arbitration, in cases adaptable
to them, with the object of preventing armed
conflicts between nations; and understanding as
to the method of their application, and the
establishment of a uniform practice in their
employment.
All invited countries accepted this program as it stood.
Most of the delegates appointed to the conference carried with
them the skepticism of their governments. Some even appeared
embarrassed to be attending a conference in which they would be
expounding goals which they felt to be rather ludicrous.

On the

American side, Andrew D. White, the highly-regarded Ambassador to
Germany, was chosen to head the delegation.

The instructions to the

American delegation by Secretary of State Hay were that the conference
should not stand in the way of continued development of the United States
military forces.

In sum, says Davis, "These instructions made certain

O)
Other members of TJ. S. delegation were Frederick W. Holls,
private citizen (speciality inti1law); Capt. W. R. Crozier (ordinance
officer); Capt. Alfred T. Mahan (naval expert); Stanford Newel (Ambassador
to the Netherlands); and Seth Low (President of Columbia University).

zh
that the United States would not participate in any moves concerning
the major intent of the peace rescript, namely, control of armaments,
hut they did indicate desire by the State Department to regain for the
United States its reputation as a champion of arbitration,"
Germany appointed as one of its delegates the Baron Karl
von Stengel, a professor at the University of Munich,

He had published

a pamphlet, Per Ewige Friede, in which war’was glorified and the
impending conference was characterized as a "daydream".

This went along

with the essential distrust the Germans held for the conference.

36

The Conference opened on May 18, 1899, in closed session,

37

M. de Staal of Russia was elected as President of the Conference, with
the offices of official secretary going to the representatives from
Belgium, Prance, Germany, the Netherlands, and Russia*

Three commissions

were formed to consider the points presented in Count Muraviev's
second circular.
armaments:

The First Commission was concerned with questions of

points one, two, three, and four of the circular.

The

Second Commission considered points five, six, and seven, dealing with
rules of war; and the Third Commission dealt with point eight,
concerning arbitration.

Each country was allowed to have representation

on all three commissions, with one vote per commission.

The only

exception was Russia, for Montinegro had no representative at the
3^
Davis, p. 80.
36
They saw the conference as a game of strategy.
37Hull, p. 22, states that the meetings were to be secret with
no stenographer to record the proceedings, but pressure was brought to
bear on the delegates by the press, resulting in information briefings
being given to the journalists. The information given, however, was,
according to Hull, "meager, half-true, or wholly false."
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conference, and commissioned Russia to act on her "behalf.

On the First

Commission, Auguste Beemaert of Belgium was selected as president,
with Munster of Germany and White of the United States as honorary
presidents.
The emphasis of the conference, "beginning with the remarks at
the opening session, was on arbitration and not armaments; but some work
was done in the First Commission to attempt to salvage something on
this question.

At the opening session of the First Commission, de Staal

stated that there was a need for ’’alleviating the burdens of peace, not
by disarmament, but by a limitation, a halt, in the ascending course
of armaments and expenditures.”
Colonel Gilinsky of Russia, after speaking of the need to curb
increased armaments, presented the specific Russian proposals for land
warfare to the First Commission. 39
follows:

1.

These, in summary form, were as

A proposal for prohibiting an increase in the number of

troops maintained in peacetime in each country (this prohibition was
to last for a period of five years); 2.
present level of troops; and 3*

A means to determine the

A prohibition against increasing

military budgets over what was then in force.
The German reply, delivered by Colonel von Schwarzhoff, was that:
The German people are not crushed beneath the
weight of expenditure and taxes; they are not
hanging on the edge of a precipice; they are
not hastening towards exhaustion and ruin.
Quite the contrary: public and private wealth
is increasing; the general welfare and standard
■^Quoted in Hull, p. 55*
on

The following points (Hull, pp. 56-57) and most of the following
arguments reference the First Commission are summarized from Hull.

of life are rising from year to year.
He continued by stating his belief in the impos s.lbility of the tasks
presented in each of the proposals.

He expressed his "confidence" in

the rulers of nations, meaning that an excess of armaments alone would
not cause war.

He went on to say that the technical difficulties

implicit in the proposals were in fact "insurmountable obstacles."
He also objected to the advisability of considering the question of
troops by itself.

The number of troops, he said, was connected to too

many other conditions, like length of service and public training of
citizens, to be a separate entity with any specific meaning.

The

defense of a nation, he pointed out, was not simply a question of the
number of troops.

One should also consider a nation’s "character,

its history, and its traditions, taking into account its economic
resources, its geographical situation, and the duties which devolve
upon it."^*

To determine the effect of any single one of these items

would be impossible.

He concluded by saying that although Germany was

receptive to the notion of a limitation of armaments, the problems in
the way of such an agreement made the notion impossible to obtain in
actuality.
Gilinsky’s reply was that it was first necessary that an agree
ment be made, then the states could arrange for its enforcement.
Von Schwazhoff’s answer was to note that a nation’s strength can be
increased by means such as railroads, and this without raising the
levels of troops.
^Quoted in Hull, p. 58.
^Tbid. , p. 59*

Mr. van Kamebeck of the Netherlands attempted to "bring the two
views closer together.

He said that even if monies spent on military

needs were not a heavy burden to a .nation, as appeared the case in
Germany, it should at least be recognized that better uses .could be
found for the money.

The question must be looked at, not from a

parochial view, but from a more universal one.

It may be, he went on

to say, that these expenditures were not really necessary for national
defense, but rather were "the result of international competition."
The Russian proposal, he pointed out, was that the cost could be reduced
to those who could not afford it by eliminating or reducing international
competition.

However, if this was not a suitable argument, he went on

to say, there was another way of looking at this problem.

If those at

home favoring reduced military spending were not satisfied, then the
"enomous military expenditures which burden nations may furnish
jp
dangerous weapons against the established social order."
This type
of argument changed no-one’s minds.
I

A military committee
cussion.

*5

was formed to consider the above dis

No minutes were kept, but its report to the commission was as

follows:
The members of the committee charged with the
examination of the propositions of Colonel
Gilinsky, relating to the first topic of
Count Mouravieff's circular, have met twice.
With the exception of Colonel Gilinsky, they
have decided unanimously: first, that it
would be very difficult to fix, even for a
term of five years, the number of troops,
without regulating at the same time other
elements of the national defense; second, that
^Ibid. , p. 61.
I
The members, all military, were from Austria, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Italy, Romania, Russia, and the United States.

it would be no less difficult to regulate
by an international agreement the elements
of this defense, organized in. each country
upon very different principles. Hence, the
committee regrets its inability to accept
the proposition made in the name of the
Russian government. The majority of its
members believe that a more thorough study
of the question by the governments them
selves would be desirable.
This was accepted by the commission.
When the specific questions which concerned armaments were
finally discussed at the Conference, they revolved around three subject
areas:

air warfare, warfare on the high seas, and warfare on land. I S
With regard to air warfare, the main topic discussed was the

throwing or dropping of explosives or projectiles from balloons.

In

commenting on this, and this appeared to reflect many of the thoughts
of the delegates on this particular subject, General Poortugael of the
Netherlands said the following:

’’Since such attacks can not be guarded

against, they resemble treachery; and’all that resembles treachery
should be scrupulously eliminated.
manner of making war!”^

Let us be chivalrous even in the

Gilinsky echoed this, saying that what each

nation then had for war was adequate.

Mounier of France expressed his

concern for the safety of non-combatants.
The subcommittee agreed to prohibit this use of balloons, but
Captain Crozier of the United States made a proposal that this prohibi
tion be limited to a period of .fuve years.

His argument was that the

use of balloons at some time in the future might be humanitarian by
^Qnoted in Hull, pp. 62-63.
For the best discussion of this see Davis.
^Quoted in Hull, p. 77*
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"localizing11 destruction at specific critical points, thus turning the
tide of battle there -without involving persons at other locations on
the battlefield.

The proposal with this amendment was adopted by

unanimous vote.
In the discussions of warfare at sea, the subcommittee handling
the problem quickly became tied down in a discussion of the second topic
of the circular, specifically the definition of what "new kinds of
/
firearms" meant. Captain Scheine of Russia said that "the term should
be understood in the sense of an entirely new type, and should not
)7
include transformations and improvements."•■■.This definition was in
turn opposed by Japan, Prance, and Great Britain.

Admiral Fisher of

Great Britain said that a country would have the best arms it could
IO
afford, because they "tend to shorten and to prevent wars."
If
restrictions were placed on new types of weaponry, he went on to say,
then the "civilized" nations come to be at a disadvantage vis-a-vis
"savage" nations.
In response, Scheine cited proposals to illustrate what he had
meant by new types.

First, reference marine cannon, he proposed that a

temporary agreement be made to limit the caliber and initial velocity
of these weapons.

Captain Mahan objected saying that if these were to

be limited, then the type and size of armor should also be limited.
Admiral Pephan of France then suggested that an agreement should be
reached whereby all nations would pledge not to introduce, for a
temporary period, "a radical transformation in existing types, such as
^7Ibid., p. 83.
^8Ibid., p. Bk-
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that from a muzzle-loading to a breech-loading cannon.11Ii9 He also
suggested that the caliber of weapons remain as they presently were.
The vote was seven for, and seven against, with the affirmative votes
being given by small powers, and the negative votes coming from the
large powers.

The result was a vote on a proposal to have this subject

sent to the governments for serious study.

This passed ten to three,

with the three negative votes from Germany, Italy, and the United
States.
/

Scheine’s next proposal was a prohibition on ’’new explosives,
or any powders more powerful than those now in use."

The delegate from

Siam opposed this because "the employment of explosives, particularly
for the small powers, constitutes a special means of defense." Great
✓
Britain and France also objected. Scheine changed his proposal to read
a prohibition of the use of "projectiles charged with explosives which
diffuse asphyxiating or deleterious gases . . . .

[these] include only

those projectiles whose object is to diffuse asphyxiating gases, and
not to those whose explosion produces incidentally such gases."
This new proposal was supported by Austria-Hungary, Denmark,
France, Great Britain, Portugal, and Russia.

Their argument was that

the purpose of the conference was to reduce what the various countries
had in the world for destruction.

Their primary goal, then, was to

attempt to prevent the occurrence of new means of destruction.

The

phantasm of death from asphyxiation,, to them, was more cruel and ghastly
than by other means then in existence.
Ibid.» p. 86.
Ibid., p. 87.

This prohibition passed with

only one dissenting vote, that of the United States*

Its argument was

that these new weapons had not been adequately tested as yet; therefore,
they might, in the end, be more humane than others which were then in
use.

The proposal for the provision was passed at a meeting of the

entire conference with only Great Britain and the United States
dissenting.^
The next subject discussed by the naval subcommittee was the ques
tion of torpedo boats and rams.

Torpedo boats (including submarines)

had not seen much use prior to 1899> and their future was questionable.
With this in mind, no specific proposals were advanced by Russia for
their prohibition.

Through general conversation, Denmark, Germany,

Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia all agreed to prohibit their
use, but only if unanimity was attained.

The United States reserved the

right for the unrestricted use of the boats, however, and AustriaHungary, France, and several other smaller nations saw that they were a
good defensive weapon for their ports.

The subject was dropped, and

the subcommittee concentrated on rams.

No agreement was reached on

these, either.

92

In the area of warfare on land, Gilinsky proposed that the use
of explosives in any conflict be confined

to that which was presently

in existence, and that a moratorium be placed on manufacturing of new
explosives.

Crozier of the United States opposed this with the standard

answer that new explosives may be better and cheaper than the old ones;
therefore, money could be saved.

<1

A vote was taken, and the subject was

Great Britain voted no because unanimity had not been attained.

92

Davis, p. 120.
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referred to the will of each state.
The subject of field guns was then discussed.

The Russians

proposed that the cannon then in use in several nations, the new rapidfire field gun, should be the limit of innovation, and that these cannon
should not be modified further.

Gilinsky further stated that armies

should be permitted to acquire these new guns if they did not already
have them.

However, the reaction was entirely negative.

except Russia wished to limit innovations.

No nation

The proposal was voted on,

with no affirmative votes, and Bulgaria and Russia abstaining.

The

subject was dropped.
Next the subject of muskets was discussed.

Gilinsky suggested

that since the majority of the muskets in use by the armies of the
world were approximately of the same caliber and quality, a period of
time should be established during which a moratorium would be placed
on changes in the types of muskets presently in use.

He made this into

a proposal and also added that no one could improve the quality of their
muskets, even if the weapon was of inferior quality than those held by
some nations.

In other words, he went on, existing types of muskets

could be improved, but a transformation of the weapon itself could not
be made; e.g. , to make them automatic.
This proposal evoked much response.

General Zuccari of Italy

saw that in reality the differences in quality and caliber of muskets
in the armies of the world was very great.

Colonel Kuepach of Austria-

Hungary said that it would be hard to define the effects of innovations,
because even small improvements could essentially transform the
character of the weapon.
In light of these responses, Russia made a counter-proposal
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covering a minimum weight and caliber for muskets, a minimum weight for
bullets, a maximum muzzle velocity, and a maximum rate of fire of twentyfive rounds per minute.

Colonel von Schwarzhoff of Germany responded

that this would not work because it would make the weapon too heavy for
the soldier.

In addition, he said, muzzle velocity depended on the type

of powder used, and since no provision was made on development of new
powders, the proposition was faulty.

The proposal was rejected.

General Poortugael of the Netherlands then proposed that a five
year moratorium on improving muskets and on_producing new ones be
instituted, and that all nations be allowed to adopt the best muskets
then in use.

The vote was ten yes, and ten no.

Colonel von

Schwarzhoff reflected the views of the major powers when he said:

MWe

"should not tie our hands in advance so that we should have to ignore
more humane methods which may be invented in the future."
Next, the subject of bullets, specifically "dumdum" bullets,
was discussed.

The argument against the dumdum was that they made

"incurable wounds" because of their tendency to flatten out upon entering
the body.

Gilinsky formulated a resolution stating; "The contracting

Powers prohibit the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in
the human body, such as bullets with hard jackets, whose jacket does not
entirely cover the core or has incisions in it."

Since these bullets

were used in large part by the British army, the provision appeared to
be directed at them.

The vote was nineteen for the resolution, and one

Negative votes were cast by Austria, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Switzerland, Turkey, and the U.S.
^Quoted in Hull, p. 181.
^Ibid., p. 182.

against (Great Britain, later joined by the United States).^
The efforts of the First Commission resulted in only three
declarations being brought before the Conference for vote.

First, the

prohibition against throwing projectiles from balloons was passed
unanimously.

Second, the prohibition against use of dumdum bullets was

passed with negative votes coming from Great Britain and the United
States.

Third, the prohibition on projectiles containing asphyxiating

gas was passed with negative votes coming from Great Britain and the
United States.
The only major reservation at the conference apparently came
from the American delegation.

It was read into the conference permanent

record and said:
Nothing contained in this Convention shall be so
construed as to require the United States of
America to depart from its traditional policy of
not intruding upon, interfering with, or
entangling itself in the political questions or
policy or internal administration of any foreign
state; nor shall anything contained in the said
Convention be construed to imply a relinquishment
by the United States of America of its traditional
attitude toward purely American questions.57
With respect to armaments, the Hague conference of 1899 was a
failure.

A reason appears to be that, as Davis concludes,
No great power— and few secondary powers—
really desired limitation of armaments.
Cherishing national and imperial ambitions,
fearful of their enemies, and distrustful of
their friends, nations sent representatives
to the Hague not to promote peace but to
prevent success for the principal Russian

56
The above discussion of the workings of the conference is
taken from Hull, Scott, and Davis. They agree on all important points.
57James Brown Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace
Conferences: The Conference of 1899 (New York, 1920), pp. 81+, 87,
quoted in Davis, p. 179-
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proposals— -proposals in which the Russians
themselves had no faith.58
It also appears that the conference attempted much more than the
delegates were willing to he party to.

The issues were decidedly

complex, and when one country suggested a way to control armaments,
others were quick to point out the infeasibility of the proposal; e.g.,
the rifle problem.

The complexity of the problems helped stymie any

movement towards armament control.

In the end, the main objective of

the original Rescript— the limitation of armaments— had been rejected,
with only peripheral and, by and large, meaningless restrictions on
armaments passed.

The major accomplishments came from the works of the

other two commissions:,

neither having to do with armaments.

In the period between the two Hague conferences, two major wars
were fought:

the Anglo-Boer war, and the Russo-Japanese war.

Moreover,

a combined European and American army
avenged the outrages of the Boxers by
sacking Peking. England fought in the
Transvaal, five thousand miles from her
base of supplies; the United States had
just conquered and now held under military
rule possessions at even greater distance
from home water. All these wars demon
strated the new significance of sea power
in history and intensified the naval
armament competition.59
Nevertheless, the subject of armaments control was becoming
more prominent in these years between the two conferences at the Hague.
This was due to the tremendous ams competition which ensued after the
Conference of 1899, and to the determination by some of the major
powers that the subject should be spoken of at the next conference.^
There was also a rising consensus that the discussions
58

Davis, p. 212.

59

^Tate, p. 29U.

60

Ibid.
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of armaments at the Conference of 1899 had been taken up, as Hull says,
"at the wrong end"; that it had devoted itself
chiefly to the "balancing of ship against ship
and tonnage against tonnage, and had conse
quently fallen into a hopeless technical tangle
and mathematical snarl; that what was needed was
a thorough study of the economic and political
aspects of the question. But this study,
recommended by the conference itself, was not
entered upon by the governments; and statesmencontinued to suggest mathematical solutions of
the problem, such as the reduction of the size
of battle ships, or the restriction of military
budgets for a term of five years to the amounts
expended during the preceding five years.61
Moreover, the various peace societies around the globe continued
to show their concern over the cost and quantity of new naval weapons.
Many resolutions made and passed at‘the various peace congresses from
190l| to 1907 called for a limitation on armaments.

One such congress,

-the Inter-Parliamentary Union, played a vital role in the onset of the
1907 Conference.

It held its I9OI4. conference at St. Louis, Missouri,

where a resolution was adopted calling for an international conference,
made up of governmental delegates of the various countries of the world,
to discuss those questions left for future consideration by the Confer
ence of 1899•

The Union requested that the President of the United

States call on other governments to establish this new conference.

On

October 21, 190i|, President Roosevelt sent a circular proposing a second
Hague Conference to the various governments of the world, but Russia
and.Japan in particular (both then engaged in war), felt that the time
was not right and the matter was postponed.
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After the Russo-Japanese war, the cry for a conference was again
6lHull, p. 69.
^Tate, pp. 319-20.

heard, hut the tone had changed.

Russia, for one, no longer wanted to

limit armaments, hut rather to increase them.

Great Britain, on the

other hand, felt that the conference should include talk of disarmament.
Roosevelt also wanted the conference to include talk of limitation of
armaments, and advocated the limiting of the size of battleships to
l£,000 tons.

France, Great Britain, Spain, and the United States all

indicated their willingness to discuss the topic of arms limitation at
the conference; hut Austria, Germany, Japan, and Russia indicated that
they would not discuss the question, even if it was introduced.
Hull feels that Russia did not want to bring up the subject for
two reasons:

first, the opposition the Russian government had faced

during the first conference, and second, the Russian1s suspicion that
if they included a discussion of limitation of armaments in the program,
it would create discord and a lack of co-operation among the delegates
at the conference.

Tate, on the other hand, feels that the desire

to increase arms was due to Russia1s poor conduct in the Russo-Japanese
war.
The Germans apparently felt that it would not be to their
advantage to limit armaments either.

They saw themselves as becoming

a great power, and were in the process of increasing the size of their
already large merchant marine.
strong navy was a necessity.

To become a great power, a large,
In sum, in the intervening years between

the two conferences, especially during the period between the proposal
for the Second Conference and its actual acceptance by the major powers;
61
See Tate, pp. 321^-29, for further discussion of Great Britain1s
views.
is for this was a speech made during the Second
Conference by the Russian delegate, M. Uelidow.

the question of disarmament, the feasibility of such a topic being
discussed, was a subject of much debate among the major nations of the
world.

In order to show her desires and good will, Great Britain did

announce in 1906 the scrapping of one battleship which was to be built,
and likewise reduced the number of submarines and destroyers it did
have; however, this was of no help.
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The President of the United States then sent a circular to the
various governments of the world proposing a new conference.

The

response was favorable, but out of deference to the Czar, Roosevelt
yielded the making of the program and the actual protocols to Nicholas II.
The conference was called for 1$ June, 19071 but when the Russian
proposal was sent to the various nations, it excluded any discussion of
the limitation of armaments.
Russia proposed a program but specifically excluded those
questions "which concern the restriction of military or naval
forces. . . . "
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The program consisted of improving the rules of land

and maritime warfare, and of improving the arbitration procedures agreed
on at the Hague Conference of 1899•
Not all governments agreed to the above conditions, however,
and several reservations were noted.

The United States, Great Britain,

and Spain, reserved the right to submit questions on the reduction or
limitation of armaments.
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On the other hand, Austria, Bolivia, Denmark,

Germany, Greece, Japan, the Netherlands, and Russia, all reserved the
6%ite, pp. 350-52.
^Quoted in Hull) p. i|.8.
67
The change in U.S. views from 1899 represented Roosevelt's
conceptions.

39

right to abstain from discussion of any topic which would appear to be
leading to no useful result.
It was almost two months into the conference in 1907 when Sir
Edward Fry of Great Britain finally brought up the subject of disarma
ment.

He pointed out that since the 1899 conference the actual expenses

for military forces had increased in large amounts.
he went on to say, could be put to better use.

These expenditures,

He acknowledged that

the idea embodied in the limit on armaments was "noble," but the
important question was, "Is this wish attainable?"
said, was willing to work towards this goal.

68

Great Britain, he

He saw, however, that it

was the duty of any and all states to provide for a defense capable of
protecting the inhabitants from any danger from outside forces; and that
only these states could decide best how to fulfill this duty.

In this,

then, lay the fact that any armament limitation must come through the
"good will" of each nation.

He concluded by proposing to establish the

"means" for securing this good will.

His declaration was as follows:

The Government of Great Britain will be ready
to communicate each year to the powers that
will do the same, its plan of constructing
new war ships and the expenditures which this
plan will require. Such an exchange of
information will facilitate an exchange of
views between the governments on the reduc
tion which by common agreement may be effected.
The Britannic Government believes that in this
way an understanding may be reached on the
expenditures which the states that agree to
pursue this course will be justified in
entering upon their budgets.^9
He then proposed a resolution which stated;
68

Quoted in Hull, p. 72.
Ibid., p. 73.

ho
(The Second Conference of Peace re-affirms the
resolution adopted by the Conference of 1899
regarding the limitations of military charges,
and considers that these military burdens have
considerably increased in almost all the coun
tries since the last date. The Conference
declares that it is especially to be desired
that the governments should undertake again
the serious study of this q u e s t i o n . 70
Following this, M.

NelidowofRussia, the President of the Second

Conference, stated

that ifthe discussion of disarmament "was notripe

in 1899 > it is not

more soin1907-

Nothing has been done in the

matter, and the conference is quite as little prepared to deal with it
to-day as it was then." 71

Any discussion of the topic at this confer

ence, he went on to say, would be "fruitless" and a probable cause of
enormous disagreement, thus jeopardizing the aims set forth in the
proposal.

The best course of action, he suggested, was that the British

resolution be affirmed to demonstrate that there was "unity" in the
general intent to limit armaments, and a consensus that the problem may
"some day" be solved.

The resolution was then adopted by acclamation.

This was the extent of discussion on this question during the Second
Conference.
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In conclusion, an excellent case can be made for the proposition
that as disarmament conferences, both of the Hague Conferences were
colossal failures.
chapter.

Proving this, however, was not the intent of this

It was, rather, to define the role of technological weapon

innovations in bringing the conferences about.
70
Quoted in Scott, Work of the Second Conference, p. 2lj..
^Quoted in Hull, pp. 7i+“7!?72
Ibid. The best account of the fourteen conventions of the
1907 conference is to be found in Scott, Work of the Second Conference,
pp. lU-23.

It has been shown that the majority, if not all, of the major
nations of the day did not feel that limitations of armaments, or even
arms budgets, could be discussed with any hope of a successful conclu
sion.

They were concerned about armament expenditures, to be sure,

but up to the time of the Czar's Rescript, no other nation had come
forward to seriously propose that a conference be initiated to limit
these arms.
Thus, when the question of the impetus for the Hague Conference
of 1899 is examined, it must be noted that if it were not for the
concern of Russia over a new rapid-fire field gun, the conference might
never have been called.

It is quite easy to reason, however, that if

arms expenditures were growing to the concern of all, then the impetus
would have come from this fact; and if not for this field gun, other
actual "causes" would have come about eventually.
To reason this way, however, is to neglect the fact that
qualitatively speaking, the existence of this new weapon changed, to a
large extent, the then prevalent concept of war.
bloody venture

War became a more

where the firepower of this new gun would increase by

six times the amount of artillery explosives which could be brought to
bear on an enemy.

Tactics would have to be changed.

Also, Russia

found herself, not as the strongest armed nation in the world, but as
one which qualitatively had been relegated to an inferior position in
firepower vis-a-vis other nations.
to the Russians.

This evidently caused great concern

Other nations in Europe which always had inferior

forces, and which did not see themselves as major powers,. were not
concerned.

Moreover, Great Britain and the United States, separated

from the threat of ground combat in Europe, were also unconcerned.

Thus

the only major Mhave-notfT nation was Russia.
When Russia went to her treasury to finance these desired guns,
however, it found itself in financial straits.

It could barely afford

these weapons, and what of the next technological innovation in weaponry?
In the financial sense, Russia had reached the limit of its ability
to purchase innovative changes.

In this light, the arguments of Tate

and Dillon of the Russian financial straits,

brought on by what

Kuropatkin and Muraviev saw as a necessary purchase of a field gun, appear
most logical.

The question that needs to be resolved., then, is was it

the new advance in weaponry or a financial problem which provided the
impetus for the Rescript?

This is an unanswerable question (any answer

is probably related to the timing of both occurrences).
In addition, one may ask if the above point is moot in the light
of the Russian proposal at the conference for a limitation on innovations
beyond these field guns.

To this I would say no, because logic appears

to suggest that Prance, Germany, and even Austria-Hungary, would not
give up their advantage in these weapons.

The only alternative for

Russia was to propose that they establish this as a limit, and allow
other nations (Russia) to attain this same level.

If they could do so,

and this level remained the ceiling of qualitative advances in field
artillery weaponry, then Russia would once again have the superior force
on the Continent.

.

By the time of the 1907 conference, however, Russia found herself
in a position of having lost face to the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese
war of 1905.

To admit under these circumstances, especially after the

negative reaction at the 1899 conference, that it desired a limitation
of armaments, would only show insecurity and weakness.

It is entirely

b3
possible that Russia expected the subject-to be brought up by others
at a third conference (a third conference was proposed at the 1907
conference)*
It remains, then, to point out that the other nations entered
into these conferences not out of a real desire to limit armaments,
but out of an obscure desire not to be the government which could be
singled out as having scuttled a conference with such high ideals.

Also,

as the emphasis on limitations of armaments was reduced as a result of
the Czar's second circular, more possibilities were opened for discussion
which were of interest to the other nations; e.g., arbitration, care
for sick, wounded, and prisoners of war, etc.

CHAPTER III

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE FOR THE LIMITATION OF
ARMAMENT, 1921-1922
The Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armament of
1921-1922 undertook to solve two fairly distinct problems; limitation
of armaments, and Pacific and Far Eastern questions.

Because both were

discussed at a single conference, there is a tendency among scholars
to attribute to the latter the primary motive for the onset of the
conference.

This is not necessarily so.

The impetus derives from both

a desire for limitation of armaments, and a desire to solve certain
problems other than armaments.

These desires interacted so as to

obscure any single reason for the onset.
Hector C. Bywater states that "in the winter of 1920-21 the
situation in the Far East was so ominous that well-informed observers
believed war between the United States and Japan to be only a question
of time. . • c"1 Perceptions were very important to each nation,

Japan

saw her moves as necessarily defensive and vital for her national
interest.

Then, as now, she was largely dependent on imports to provide

her with sufficient raw materials to feed and clothe her population, as
well as to provide for the creation of industries for her economic
growth.

She saw the Far East and Pacific region as a vital domain which

must remain secure.

Any actions by any other nation to intrude into the

■^Hector C. Bywater, Sea Power in the Pacific; A Study of the
American-Japanese Naval ProbIem72d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. ,
193U> ° 192177 p. ix.
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area and halt this lifeline flow of materials would hurt Japan immensely.
Hie fact that the United States was in the best position to oppose
Japanese ambitions in the area, especially in China, served to create
strong feelings of tensions between the two.

2

On the other hand, especially after the Russo-Japanese War in
1905, the United States began to perceive Japan as an imperialistic
power and a definite threat to American interests in the Pacific.

This

war had ended with Japan the surprising victor, and her "victor spoils”;
the establishment of a "virtual protectorate" over Manchuria, the
annexation of Korea in 1910, her issuance of the "Twenty-one Demands"
to China in 1915 > and her actions in Siberia in 1918-1921, only served
3
to sharpen the United States1 suspicion of Japan.
China had the potential for causing the largest problems.
Antagonisms rose as Japan was able to gain control over portions of
previously-held German possessions in China and the Pacific after the
war.

Japan needed China, said Raymond Buell, because without her,

Japan could not accomplish her goal of "Pan-Asiaism . . • the union of
all yellow peoples under Japanese leadership. . .

To gain China1s

loyalty, Japan sought to convince the Chinese that if they did not
align with Japan, they would become "an anglo-American sphere of
influence. . . ."5
2
Jonathan Mitchell, Goose Steps to Peace (Boston: Little, Brown &
Co., 193l) 9 P* 22.
^Ibid., pp. 39- U b »
^Raymond Leslie Buell, The Washington Conference (New York:
D. Appleton & Co., 1922), p. i+8.
5
M. Sato, speech entitled "If Japan and America Fight," 1921,
quoted in ibid. , p. I4.
9.
•
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It appears , according to Buell, that World War I allowed
Japan to use the-West's "preoccupation” with Europe to "consolidate”
her position in Asia.

As she took control of portions of China, annexed

various German islands north of the Equator, and moved into Siberia,
however, she came to be seen by the United States as a highly imperialist
nation with the ultimate goal of "establishing complete political and
economic control" of East Asia.^
In many ways, Buell states, Japan was protected and could
continue to pursue her ambitions because of the existence of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

This alliance had "for twenty years not only

protected the aggressions of the Japanese military machine from the
rj

interference of outside powers, but . . . [had] encouraged them."
This alliance had been formulated in 1902 as an insurance against
continued Russian imperialism in East Asia.

Great Britain not only had

to be concerned with the German threat in the European theater, but
with Russian incursions into British "spheres of influence," in South
Asia and the Pacific as well.

British strength was such that alone

she could protect either her homeland in the North Sea, or her possessions
in the Pacific, but not both.

With this alliance, however, she could

remove most of her Pacific fleet into the North Sea.

In essence, this

alliance provided each nation with more security as well as freedom of
movement in the area than it would have had alone.

8

To Japan, the alliance was just as advantageous.

c
Buell, p. 10.
7Ibid., p. 103.
8Ibid., p. 107.

She likewise

hi
wished to halt Russian imperialism, hut by declaring war on Russia.
She "dared not do so single handed," however, "because of the probability
9
of the intervention of Prance, if not Germany, in behalf of Russia."
An alliance with Great Britain could effectively preclude this occur
rence.

In addition, an alliance with an established and sophisticated

power such as Great Britain would do much to enhance JapanTs diplomatic
position in the world.

This would "serve admirably as a billet d’entree

into the international community. ^
The alliance, however, was due to expire on July 13, 1921, and
many officials in Great Britain wished to abrogate it altogether.

The

Japanese, it was thought, had bent the agreement numerous times and in
the process had managed to ruffle too many British feathers.

A member

of Britain’s Par Eastern Department voiced a popular view when he
stated that the policies of the Japanese were now "almost diametrically
opposed to the best interests of not only Great Britain and the United
States but of China. . . .

[it had] for its ultimate aim a complete

Japanese hegemony over China, politically, economically and probably
militarily.

Others saw that the alliance had simply outgrown its

original usefulness.

Most critics saw a possibility of a war between

the United States and Japan, and were afraid that if this did happen,
Great Britain, under the alliance, would be obligated to support Japan.
9
Ibid.

10
Ibid.

"^Rohan 0. Butler et al, eds., Documents on British Foreign
Policy, 1919-1939 (London, 1966), Memorandum by Victor Wellesley,
June 1, 1920, P. 0. F2l59/l99/23, quoted in Thomas H. Buckley, The
United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1970), p. 29.
12
Lloyd George denied that the British would oppose the United
States. Pressures for ending the alliance also came from Canada and
Australia.

12

Some members of the British government wished to retain the
alliance in its current format for economic reasons; i.e., to relieve
Britain of her need to keep a fleet in the Pacific, which was to
protect her importation of raw materials and foodstuffs from that
region.

To most, however, the dilemma was that, if the alliance was

renewed, the United States would look unfavorably on the matter.

If it

was not, the Japanese could become the 11enemy" and wreck havoc on
British interests in the area.

It appears to have been a case of

"damned if you do, and damned if you don*t.11 Many, then, appeared to
opt for a condition resembling the alliance, but without the obligations
then inherent in it.
The Japanese, on the other hand, were positive in their desire
to preserve the' alliance.
been initially.

They saw the alliance as useful as it had

It had helped shield Japan from adverse reactions to

her various moves, especially in China; and it had, above all, enabled
Japan to operate a flexible policy in her relations with other powers
in the area. 13

The Japanese were so intent on its retention, for

example, that when the rumor reached Japan in early 1921 that Lloyd
George wished to abrogate the Alliance, Crown Prince Hirohito was rushed
to England to appeal to the British government.^
In the midst of these occurrences, an arms race was beginning
to take place which was of growing concern to these nations.

Before

1916, the United States Navy ranked a poor third behind those of Great
Britain and Germany.

In that year, however, Congress passed the Naval

TO
Alfred Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1923)» pp. 89-91«
14yiitchell,p. ,50* It was quite an unusual move for a member
of the royal familyto be sent on such a mission.
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Appropriations Act of August

2 9

, 1 J 1 6 , -which provided funds for, and

authorized construction of, 1$6 vessels for the navy.
16 capital ships

1*5

These included

: 10 battleships and 6 battle-cruisers.

l6

The

entire program was to have been completed in three years; but due to
the United States1 entry into World War I, much of it had been
suspended.

At the end of the war only one battleship had been.completed,

with most of the others in various stages of Construction. 17
At this time, a decision was made to fulfill Woodrow Wilson1s
1916 statement that the United States should have "incomparably the
most adequate Wavy in the world."

18

The navy opted to continue the

1916 program, and construction either continued or began on all capital
ships authorized by the act.

The General Naval Board also called for

another three year program to build three more battleships with the
objective, as stated in one official navy report, to create a "navy
equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation in the
world."^^
One of the major reasons for this desire, according to Thomas
Buckley, was "the old rivalry between the governments of Great Britain
-

Buell defines a capital ship as "a vessel of war, not an air
craft carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons . . .standard
displacement, or which carries a gun with a caliber exceeding 8 inches
(203 millimeters)."
16
The battleships were to have 12-16 "guns apiece, and the
battle-cruisers 8-16" guns.
17
Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington
Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970),
p. 29.
^Quoted in Buell, p. 11*1.
^"Report of the General Board of the Navy, September 21*, 1920"
in Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1920, Appendix A, quoted in
Buell, p. 11*0.

and the United States. . .

20

After the end of World War I, this

rivalry became concerned with who would be the superior sea power.
British were adamant that their "naval supremacy" be retained.

The

In

October, 1918 > says Buckley, Prime Minister David Lloyd George told a
Wilson confidant, Colonel Edward M. House, that "Great Britain would
spend her last guinea to keep a navy superior to that of the United
21
States or any other power."
Winston S. Churchill, also in 1918,
stated to the House of Commons:
Nothing in the world, nothing that you may
think of, or dream of, or anyone may tell
you; no arguments, however specious; no
appeals however seductive, must lead you to
abandon that naval supremacy on which the
life of our country depends.22
As it became obvious to Great Britain that the United States was not to
enter the League of Nations and was to continue its 1916 naval program,
saysBuckley, Britain "publicly began to veer toward
the United

States .. . which threatened to make

a naval race with

the Anglo-German

competition of the early 1900’s look like a lobster quadrille."

23

The Japanese also viewed the 1916 Naval Appropriations Bill,
coupled with renewed American interest in the Pacific and Far East,^
20

Buckley, pp. 19-20.

^^Mary Klachko, "Anglo-American Naval Competition, 1918-1922,"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1962), p. 77>
quoted in Buckley, p. 20.
22

Speech of November 1918, in Benjamin H. Williams, The United
States and Disarmament (New York, 1931)> P* 137> quoted in Buckley,
pp. 2^-25.
23
Buckley, p. 23. I see no physical evidence of this; however,
I will accept the supposition of the existence of a fervent arms race
"mentality."
pi
As the war began to close European markets, the U.S. began to
move more fully into the Pacific region in search of trade and the
development of new foreign markets. This was very suspicious to Japan.
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with great trepidation.
own in response.

They hegan various armament programs of their

The Tokyo journal, Yorodzu, indicated in 1920 that the

United States was forcing Japan to arm.

It stated, "If America were

not augmenting her naval armaments, Japan would be at liberty to
economize in the same direction.

It is, however, because of the

American menace that we are forced to enhance our naval power at the
cost of heavy taxation, under which the people are groaning.1125
During the naval budget debates of 1920, a member of the Diet stated,
"America appears to think she is divinely appointed to rule the world
with a big stick.

What is the purpose of her colossal navy if it is

not to make her power supreme in every part of the world."

26

The newspaper, Nichi Nichi, stated, in an article carried in
1920, that "all the powers" were of agreement that naval armaments should
be limited, but because of the United States’ increasing naval strength,
"even if other Powers should strictly and faithfully adhere to the
principle of reduction, . . . the peace of the world will just the same
be menaced by the naval power of America."

27

The paper went on to say

that the "Double-Eight Program" was not enough for proper defense of
Japan, and claimed that Japan needed a minimum of 22+ capital ships.
25
Quoted in ffywater, Sea Power, p. 1$1.

28

26
Ibid., p. 156.

27
Pall Mall Gazette, November 2, 1920 (correspondent writing
from Tokyo on October 17, 1920), quoted in Archibald Hurd, "Naval
Supremacy: Great Britain or the United States," Fortnightly Review
CYIII (December 1, 1920): 921.
28
The "Double-Eight Program" is called by many different names.
I have chosen the one used in Yamato Ichihashi, The Washington Conference
and After (Stanford: Stanford University Press, I928). The program
itself was formulated after the 1905 war as Japanese naval experts saw a
need for two-squadrons, each consisting of 8 capital ships, to be re
placed every 8 years. It was finally passed by the Diet in 1920, and
designed to be completed by March, 1928.
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The chart, as Table 1, shows a reason for Japan*s fears.
The chart tells us that if the currently authorized construction
programs in each country were to be carried to completion, by 1921+
the United States and Great Britain would have been almost equal in
capital ships, but Japan would have been only half as strong.
conclusion, however, is not complete.

This

It also must be noted that in

1921+ the vast majority of British ships would have been veicy old and
outdated.

The United States and Japan, on the other hand, would have

had capital ships with more firepower (notice the disparity in 1st
class vessels), more armor, and a faster speed.

"Actually, the

American Navy by 1921+ would have been as strong in capital ship
efficiency as the British and Japanese Navies combined, if no further
Building programs had been adopted by any of these powers."

29

By

I92I+, then, the United States would have been supreme on the high seas:
a position that Great Britain had held in most, if not all, of the
nineteenth century.
The three countries involved in this "race," however, soon
began to realize the folly of pursuing their present paths.
buildup was beginning to cost her dearly by 1921.

Japan's

Her naval expendi

tures alone rose from $85 million in 1915 to $21+5 million in..1921.
The 1921 figure represented approximately one-third of her entire budget
for that year.

30

But even by spending at this high level, Japan could

only hope that if both nations built all that was authorized, then the
ratio of Japan to United States in capital ships would be 1:2.
29Buell, p. lljl*.
3°Ibid., pp. 139-1+2.

In
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TABLE 1
CAPITAL SHIPS, ON HAND AM) AUTHORIZED31
1921

United States:
Ships*. . . . . . . .
17
Displacement, tons. . 1+67>25>0 tons
188
Guns. • . . .......
Great Britain:
Ships . .. • • .
Displacement, tons.
Guns. . . . . . . .

32
808,200 tons
281+

Japan:
11
Ships • . . . . . . .
Displacement, tons. . 319 >11+0 tons
Guns. . . . . . . . .
108

1921+ (estimated)

35 (27-lst class/l8-2d class)
l,l£0 ,6£0 tons
3hO

36 (l8-lst class/l8-2d
883>290 tons

17 (ll+-lst class/3-2d class)
51+3>lU0 tons
161+

*Por 1924, figures are divided into 1st class (those ships with
11+ inch or larger guns) and 2nd class (those ships with guns under
11+ inches).

31From figures in "Leading Navies Compared," Scientific American
(February 12, 1921) , and Archibald Hurd (fn. 27). The figures for 1921+differ slightly in both of these articles, but the larger figure has
been used here whenever differences occurred.

other words, even spending as much as they were, Japan could hope to
come no closer than one-half the size of the United States1 capital
ship fleet.

32

Baron Kato, then Japan's Minister of the Marine, let it be
known that enough was enough.

In an interview with the Associated Press

in March, 1921, he stated that Japan would be willing to give up her
Double-Eight Program if the other major naval, powers would agree to
halt their naval construction.

Japan recognized, as Yarnato Ichihashi

states, that the expense of naval aimaments was "almost ruinous to
Japan's general interests." 33 Mitchell, writing in 1931? stated that
Japan's financial crisis of 1921 was the worst of any in its entire
history.
Great Britain also recognized the dangers inherent in any arms
race; and, in fact, had begun a small-scale limitation program a few
years earlier. 35 In 1921, Great Britain's navy was a total of
1,753>539 tons; the United States had 1 ,302,141+1 tons; and Japan had a
total of 61+1,852 tons.

Britain had not begun construction on many

vessels since 1916, however, and in 1921 was constructing only 182,950
tons of all types of navy ships.

Of these, four capital ships were

under construction, totaling 172,000 tons.

The United States, on the

32
Bywater, Sea Power, pp. 155-56.
33
Ichihashi, (fn. 28), p. 19. Yamato Ichihashi was the Secretary
to Baron Kato, Senior Delegate of Japan to the Washington Conference in
1921-1922.
^^Mitchell, p. 50.
35In 1918, expenses caused two-thirds of British battleships to
be placed in reserve. The remaining one-third was seen as still too
expensive to operate, however, and several of these were also placed in
reserve. Bywater, Sea Power, p. 28.

other hand, had 15 capital ships (618,000 tons) under construction, as
did Japan (599j700 tons).
supremacy of her navy.

Publicly, Britain spoke for continued

Privately, however, this was not so.

Lloyd

George, in a meeting of the Standing Defence Subcommittee of the Cabinet
on December 1)., 1920, "pointed out that a naval race could ruin Britain,
for the country might have to repay its war debt to the Americans before
starting construction, and the country was already having serious
financial problems." 37 Even though Lloyd George wanted a large navy, he
was enough of a realist to recognize that any naval race could bankrupt
Britain.
The United States also began to face up to the reality of arms
expenditures.

In 1915-1916, her naval expenditures had been only

$155>029,000.

In 1917-1918, however, this figure had risen to

Si,268,000,000.

After the war, the expenses rose even higher as America
OD
began a program "designated to make its navy second to none."
The
1916 act, however, had called for the manufacture of 16 capital ships,
but with a stipulation that each vessel not cost more than a certain
amount.

Capital ships, by this time, were approaching $1+0 million

apiece to build, and projections estimated that they would become obso
lete within two decades.

Replacement costs at that time, considering

inflation, would be astonomical. 39

By 1919 > it was estimated that it

would take $850,000,000 just to complete the capital ship portion of the
36
•
Buckley, p. 23. Figures are from "Limitation of Armaments:
Part II," General Board Report 1088a, (September 17, 1921).
■^Buckley, p. 25*
OO
Ichihashi, p . 1+.
■^Buell, pp. 11+1+-1+6.
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1916 program, not tor mention future maintenance costs.^

The United

States was spending 12 percent of her national budget on naval expendi
tures.^"

In other words, in the United States and Great Britain, budget

considerations began to override considerations of supreme naval power.
In addition to predicted financial problems, each nation was
confronted with changes in the technology of weaponry which was beginning
to change the concept of war, at least on the high seas.

Prior to

World War I, the use of the capital ship by the navies of the world had
indicated that an absolute top priority was given this weapon by all.
To have a strong, viable naval force meant to have a fleet of capital
ships.

By 1921, however, these nations were willing to give up produc

tion of capital ships, and even scrap some of the older ones.

This can

be described by explanation of the growth of the popularity of two more
or less novel innovations in weaponry:

the submarine and the airplane.

Before World War I, the potential of the submarine had been seen
by Admiral Sir Percy Scott.

He stated, in 1912, that the "battleship

had outlived her usefulness, and ought to be scrapped forthwith as an
extravagant anachronism."^

His prediction and argument was that the

submarine would rule the high seas in the future because of its stealth
)^
and killing power.
It had been in existence for several decades, but
the initial stages of World War I had not seen its extensive use.

As the

German navy began to receive a considerable beating at the hands of
Great Britain’s fleet, however, it found itself, as Arthur Pollen states,
^Hector C. Bywater, "The Limitation of Naval Armaments," Atlantic
Monthly (February 1922): 260-61, hereafter referred to as Bywater, L. N. A .
^Buckley, p. 60.

^Quotedin Bywater, L. N. A., p. 261.

^Bywater, L. N. A., p. 261.
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"condemned to utter sea helplessness— unless a new navy conld be called
into existence and a new sea war fought."^
As this weapon system "began to he completed and placed into
service, the death totals attributable to its use began to take on
quite impressive proportions.

In February, March and April, 1916*

submarines sank 1j50>000, 500,000 and 900,000 tons of shipping, respec
tively.

At February and March rates over 25 percent of the world1s

shipping would have been sunk in one year.
percent would have been.

At April’s rate, over I4.O

With these facts, Pollen says, "For the first

time since August, 1911|.» the complete failure, if not the defeat, of
2*5
the Allies was in sight.
Allied tactics were changed to meet the
threat of the submarine and, by and large, they were successful.

In

total, Germany sank over 11 million tons of shipping, but it failed
when up against capital vessels.
This failure, however, was not to discredit the submarine’s,
potential value to a nation.

This was recognized, and after the war,

capital ships came under verbal fire again.

Admiral Sims, for example,

stated that "battleships are not worth the powder to blow them to hell;
the future of the battleship is that it is just going to fade out of
existence.”^

Sir Percy Scott again reiterated his view that "the

introduction of the vessels that swim under water has , in my opinion,
enitrely done away with the utility of the ships that swim on the top of
the water. . . .

Uo man-of-war will dare to come even within sight of a

coast that is adequately-protected by submarines.

J7

In addition,

^Arthur H. Pollen, "The Submarine," Foreign Affairs Y
(July 1927): 557.
^Ibid., p. 558.

^Quoted in Buell, p. 235-

Ibid.
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German Admiral Von Scheer stated that "an adequate submarine navy would
Io
enable a comparatively weak nation to pursue an overseas policy."
This latter comment coincides with Bywater's assessment in Sea Power in
the Pacific that the torpedo, by whatever means launched (mostly sub
marines), would become "a favourite weapon with those countries which
have to maintain a naval establishment on limited funds."

ho

The Japanese, for one, were rapidly expanding their submarine
fleet.

By 1921, estimates placed the Japanese submarine’force at 107;

all but l£ ocean-going.

It was rumored at that time that Admiral Kato

wanted to increase the number to 15>0 by 1925>.

Bywater also states that

"several writers in the Japanese Press" began to urge the Japanese govern
ment to change its naval policy by decreasing reliance on capital ships
and increasing the use and size of the submarine fleet.

He does add,

however, that at the time of the publication of .his book (1921) , Japanese
as well as American and British naval experts were still considering the
capital ship as "the first and most important element of sea-power."
Admiral Kato appears to have summed the official naval philosophy of all
concerned when, in the Diet in 1919 j he said, "The more we study the
lessons of the war, the stronger does our conviction grow that the last
word in naval warfare rests with the big ship and the big gun."

91

Bywater sums the above best in The Limitation of Naval Armaments.
He states that the submarine started slowly in World War I, but soon it
began to become the dominate naval weapon system.

The question of its

^8Ibid., p. 236.
^Bywater, Sea Power, p. 216. Also, keep this in mind when
observing France*s objections to abolishing submarines at the conference.*
^Bywater, Sea Power, p. 236.

^Ibid.
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worth relative to a capital ship was never answered, however, because
the Germans never confronted an allied capital ship in a head-to-head
battle.

They were confined, instead, to attacks on merchant vessels.

’’Broadly speaking,” Bywater states, ”it may be said that the submarine
has not proved its claim to have superseded the battleship; and the fear
of the submarine alone would not have justified the suspension of
battleship construction.

At the same time, it has compelled naval

52
architects to pay increased attention to the safety of large warships.”

This proved to be very expensive because of the large increases in
armor thickness necessary below the water-line.
Another novel weapon innovation which caused similar comments
was the airplane.

Bywater concludes that the use of the airplane in

World War I by the United States ”may prove to have been the
blow" to the capital ship. 53

death-

The United States conducted post-war

tests on the effect of aerial bombs on captured Geiman ships.
tests were veiy impressive.

These

The following is a portion of the report

on the testing.
Aircraft carrying high-capacity high-explosive
bombs of sufficient size have adequate offensive
power to sink or seriously damage any naval
vessel at present constructed, provided such
projectiles can be placed in the water close
alongside the vessel. Furthermore, it will be
difficult, if not impossible, to build any type
of vessel of sufficient strength to withstand the
destructive force that can be obtained with the
largest bombs that aeroplanes may be able to
carry from shore bases or sheltered harbors. . . .
It is probable, however, that future develop
ment will make such operations practicable. . . .5U
52
Bywater, L. U. A., p. 262.
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Ibid.

^Report of the Joint Board (j. B. No. lj.39? Serial No. 159) to
the Secretaiy of the Navy, August 18, 1921, quoted in Bywater, L. N. A.,
p. 263. Also in Buell, pp. 236-37*

60

This, to Bywater, was "the most serious indictment of the capital ship
which has yet been framed.”
When cost comparisons were made of these novel weapon innovations
against capital ships, the differences were very impressive.

Bywater

states that in 1921, 1*00 of the largest airplanes or lf> of the most
sophisticated submarines could be built for the cost of 1 battleship.
Also important to consider, he said, was that the airplane and the
submarine both were just beginning their evolutionary process; while
innovative development of the capital ships had all but halted.
this meant that capital ships were becoming obsolete.

All of

As these newer

innovations were devised and perfected, the capital ship would need more
armor, bigger and longer range guns, more speed.
however, the price would climb.
1920, was cited as an example.

As these were added,

The British Hood, just finished in
This ship cost $3^,000,000 to complete,

and in 1920 it was seen as the best ever made; however, as Bywater shows,
it was outdated by 1921.

At that time, Sir George Thurston estimated

that the ideal battleship would need to be at least 57>000 tons, with
8-18 inch guns (the Hood was almost 20,000 tons and several guns short).
This ’'ideal" would cost $60,000,000.
This discussion indicates the situation as it existed prior to
the onset of the Washington Conference.

As each nation grew more

concerned with its special interests, financial burdens and conceptions
of existing and new weaponry, it began diplomatic moves designed to
bring about some sort of conference to help settle the existing problems.
On July 11, 1921, for example, Lloyd George, in a speech, made the point
55
Bywater, L. H. A., p. 263.
^Ibid., pp. 262-61;.
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that Japan was an "old and proud Ally," and that the United States was
the nation "closest to our aims and ideals with whom it is for us not
merely a desire and an interest but a deeply rooted instinct to consult
and co-operate." 57

What George said was that Great Britain had a great

interest in both nations, and would dislike to see war between the two.
It also appears that George was warning Japan that she could not expect
Great Britain to join her in a fight against the United States.
This brings to light the possibility that Great Britain, there
fore, desired to act as arbiter to reduce the confrontation between
the United States and Japan, as well as to change the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance.

The excuse of arms limitation, then, may have been "only a

door;through which the British might enter into negotiations with both
the United States and Japan."

58

As Buell conceives it, Great Britain

wished to terminate the Alliance, but "as long as the question of naval
competition remained unsolved, the termination of the . . . Alliance was
impossible." 59
^
To Japan, the request for a conference may have been a sincere
desire to limit armaments.

She wished to perpetuate the alliance, for

she was afraid of the United States' naval buildup.

In I9I8-I92O,

because of an inability to achieve equality with the United States,
Japan resolved to maintain at least a 10:7 ratio
what she conceived of as adequate security.

6l

60

in order to achieve

This desire, however, was

57London Times, 12 July 1921, quoted in Ichihashi, p. 20.
^Buckley , p. 3U*

^Buell, p. 121;.

^All ratios are given with the base figure of 10 assigned to the
United States* naval strength.
Buckley, pp. 78-80.

62

halted by budget constraints.
Also involved, but to a smaller degree, in the desire to convoke
a conference was the rationalization that armaments had been a root
cause of World War I.

Arthur Pollen is convinced that after the war ..

the powers in the world realized that it was the "military autocracies"
of Central Europe which had caused the war.

They did this by, in

essence, following "policies abroad that only material force could
sustain. . . . "

These policies had bred the need for amaments, and

"armaments had bred war. . . ."62

Whether true or not, the important

factor, as would be indicated in the opening remarks at the conference,
was that various governments perceived that theywere at least a cause
of war.

Buell states that prior to World War I, many nations* leaders

saw armaments as a preserver of peace in the world, especially in
Europe.

It came to be recognized after the war, however, that a large

quantity of arms does not necessarily mean an absence of war.

As Buell

says, it was seen that "armaments serve merely to disturb peace. . . .
[and] if nations feverishly construct great battleships and conscript

6

great armies, it is certain that some time they will be used."

It

was, after all, he suggests, the presence of large numbers of naval
armaments that "made war between Japan and the United States a probabil-

The election of Warren G. Harding as President of the United
States appears to have "tipped the scales" and brought about a U.S.
desire to convoke a conference.

6

Buell, p. II4.6.

As pointed out in Buckley, Harding

(emphasis his)

desired a conference because it would provide the means by -which "just,
thoughtful, righteous peoples, who are not seeking to seize something
which does not belong to them, can live peaceably together, and eliminate causes of conflict." 66

Even though Harding oversimplified, says

Buckley, he did reflect a common idea of rationality of the day:

if .

rational men were to gather about a conference table, disputes could be
settled.

66

In his inaugural speech, Harding appeared to set the stage

for the conference.

He intimated that although the United States would

not enter into the League of Nations, it would be amenable to meeting
with other nations in order "to recommend a way to approximate disarma
ment and relieve the crushing burdens of military and naval establish
ments."0^
Great Britain was also moving in this direction.

68

At the

Imperial Conference in London on June 20, 1921, Lloyd George stated that
sea power was the basis of British existence; therefore, he said, "We
have . . . to look to measures which our security requires.
nothing more.

We cannot be content with less."

We aim at

69
■ With this, he called

for a conference to discuss the potential explosive issues over the
Pacific and Par East.
On July 8 , 1921, the United States’ Secretary of State, Charles
66

Transcript of Presidential Press Conference of December 23,
1921, Harding Papers, quoted in Buckley, p. l£.
^Buckley, pp. 16-16.
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Congressional Record, March 2|, 1921, pp. J4.-6, quoted in
Buckley, p. 1)4.
^Buckley, p. 30.
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Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of United
Kingdom, the Dominions,■and India: Held in June, July, and August, 1921
Summaiy of Proceedings and Documents (London, 1921), p. 13, quoted in
Buckley, p. 31 •
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Evans Hughes, sent a wire to his ambassadors in Great Britain, Prance,
Italy and Japan, directing them to determine whether or not the above
countries would meet "in a conference on limitation of armament . . •
70
to be held in Washington at a mutually convenient time."

At the same

time, the United States also suggested that, since the question of
limitation of armaments was so closely intertwined with certain Pacific
and Par Eastern problems, perhaps questions of this nature should be
included in the conference.

All indicated their tentative agreement to

the formal proposal by July 11, 1921.

Formal invitations were mailed

to Prance, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and China on August 11., 1921.
On October 1+, 1921, invitations were extended to Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Portugal. 71
It is difficult to tell whether the British or the Americans
were the instigators of the Washington Conference, but several messages
translated by Herbert 0. Yardley in The American Black Chamber do
indicate that there is reason to suspect that it was Great Britain who
convoked the conference through

the United States.

72

In a telegram of

July 5, 1921, from the Japanese Ambassador in London to the Japanese
government, it was stated that the ambassador and-Lord Curzon had spoken
of the Anglo--Japanese Alliance in connection with the possibility of
opening a Pacific conference.

In this discussion, Lord Curzon indicated

70
Telegram from Charles Evans Hughes to United States Ambassador
to Great Britain George Harvey, July 8, 1921, quoted in Buckley, p. 32.
^Ichihashi, pp. 10-11.
72
Herbert 0. Yardley was the creator and director of the Crypto
graphic Bureau (colloq. , The Black Chamber) of the United States which
was in operation during the time of the Washington Conference. Yardley
and his group were involved with code breaking; especially with regard to
Japanese codes. Many of the telegrams quoted have been destroyed and
can be found only in his book, The American Black Chamber.
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that he wanted Japan* s views before communicating with the/United
States* Ambassador.' A telegram from the same'source on July 8, 1921,
indicated that both Japan and Lord Curzon wanted the invitation for
such a conference to "appear to proceed, from the American Government
and not to have it appear as the plan of the British government." 73
The Japanese were reluctant to come to a conference on Pacific
and Par East problems, however, and a cable dated July 13, 1921 from
Tokyo set forth Japan’s guidelines.

It stated:

The Japanese Government wishes the subject
of discussion to be limited to the limitation
of armament questions, but in case it is
necessary to discuss also Far Eastern and
Pacific problems, this discussion should be
limited to questions of general principles . . .
concerning merely China. ( h
The next cable directed the Japanese Ambassador to go directly to
Hughes and agree to a conference on the limitation of arms, but to
indicate that an inclusion of Pacific and Par Eastern problems would
complicate

the conference too much.

The cable went on tostate that if

Hughes would not agree to drop these subjects,

then the Japanese

Ambassador should revert to the guidelines shown in the preceding cable
(footnote Ik) •
In a cable dated July l£, 1921, the Japanese revealed that they
were afraid that Great Britain had proposed the conference to quash the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance by destroying its value; and they were convinced
that Great Britain’s first concern was not arms limitation as was the
United States’, but rather Pacific and Par East problems.

Because of

73
Herbert 0, Yardley, The American Black Chamber (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Co. , 1931) , P- 28i+.

^Telegram No. 286, July 13, 1921, Tokio to Washington, quoted
in Yardley, p. 287.
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their fear, a cable dated July 23 from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador
in London stated that they thought
that it would be an opportune policy to
inform Great Britain of the substance of our
answer to America, and to work to secure a
complete understanding between Great Britain
and Japan before the conference.75
Additional cables alluded to this same desire for Anglo-Japanese collab
oration prior to the conference.
The formal invitation mailed to the various nations indicated that
arms limitation was to be the top priority at the conference, primarily
because of cost considerations.

In part the invitation stated:

The President is deeply gratified at the
cordial response to his. suggestion that there
should be a conference on the subject of Limita
tion of Armament, in connection with which
Pacific and Par Eastern questions should be
discussed. . . .
The enormous disbursements
in the rivalries of armaments manifestly constitute the greater part of the encumbrance upon
enterprise and national prosperity; .
expense of this nature is not only without
economic justification but is a constant menace
to the peace of the world rather than an
assurance of its preservation.76

•

It went on to say that while the consideration of naval armaments would
have priority, questions of all types of arms limits would be considered.
All invited nations entered the conference willingly except for
Japan.

She was interested in the limitation of armaments, but, as

Telegram No. 882+, July 23, 1921, Tokio to Washington, quoted
in Yardley, p. 296.
Y6
Conference on the Limitation of Armament; Washington, Novem
ber 12, 1921-February 6, 1922 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1922), pp. i+~5, hereafter referred to as C. L. A. C. L. A . is
an official publication of the United States government, supposedly
containing all of the committee as well as subcommittee proceedings in
its 1,757 pages. It also contains all official documents (which can
also be found in International Conciliation, Nos. 169-182, December 1921January 1923)•
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shown above, she was very skeptical of joining a conference designed "to
deal with Pacific and Par East problems.

She was entrenched in Siberia,

Korea, parts of China, in several islands in the Pacific, and in
Manchuria.

As Buell states, "Japan had never been closer to realizing

the dream of . . . hegemony over Asia [than] in 1921."77 Much of the
Japanese media's response was to lament the fact that Japan had to enter
into such a western "plot" designed to give the United States control of
China.

Buell says that a large portion of the Japanese government

also felt somewhat the same way.
agree to participate?

If the above is so, then why did Japan

Buell states that Japan could not refuse.

If

it did, he states, then Japan would have been admitting imperialist
ambitions to all.

To do so would place her as an "outcast" (in her view)

in international society. 79
Japan's reply on July ll* to the invitation indicated her
skepticism.

After agreeing to enter into the limitation of arms portion

of the conference to "seek to secure an enduring peace of the world and
to promote advancement of human welfare," Japan asked for time to consider
77Buell, pp. 11+8-1*9.
7^H. W. Kinney, "Puzzled Japan," The Outlook August 21*, 1921,
p. 61*2. Kinney speculated that the Japanese might have seen the confer
ence as "a gigantic international conspiracy of white nations."
Ichihashi says that this was a "childish" way to think.
79
Buell, pp. 11*9-50. Ichihashi also indicates this skepticism
on the part of Japan; not about arms limitation which it desired, but
about Pacific and Ear East problems. The Japanese writers began to call
the conference the "Pacific Conference," and stated that arms limitation
was evidently not so important. The reason for the Japanese lack of
enthusiasm, said Ichihashi, was because of inclusion of complicated
Pacific and Par Eastern questions into a simple idea of arms limitation.
As Ichihashi says, to the Japanese, "armament limitation required no
argument, the only requisite being an international understanding fixing
a simultaneous action on the part of the interested powers." Ichihashi,
p. 13.
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the other purpose of the conference.

Its request said:

"hut in

regard to a conference on the Pacific and Par Eastern questions the
Government, before it would express its views, would desire to know the
nature and scope of the American proposal in order to ensure the success
of such a conference."

80

The Japanese government notified the United

States on July 27 that they would accept the invitation for both "sub
conferences."
Ichihashi says that to understand Japan1s initial reluctance to
enter into the conference, one must realize that Japan had expected,
initially, to be invited to an arms limitation conference involving
only three powers.

These powers, to Japan, were the only nations which

had the expertise, finances, and the desire to engage in massive naval
building programs.

Because of this, they were also bound to realize the

inherent dangers in "competitive construction."

8l

This was what Japan

was interested in; not war,or in letting other powers seize

gains in

the Pacific region which ithad achieved over many decades.
The other powers invited appear to have been favorably disposed
to the notion of a disarmament conference..

Some initially questioned

the motives of the United States, and entertained

questions as to the

worth of such a conference; but, by and large, they looked forward to
its opening.

In accepting the invitation to the conference, however,

Premier Briand of Prance stated in his message to parliament on July 12,
1921, that he appreciated having been invited to a conference which
would assure the continuity and the stability of peace in the region of
80
Ji.ji (Tokyo), l£ July 1921, quoted in Ichihashi, p. 16.
8l
Ichihashi, pp. 18-19.

the Pacific.”

Nowhere did he mention-the question of, or his willing

ness to discuss 5 arms limitation.
The proposed agenda for the conference was announced by the
Department of State on September 10, 1921.

It was divided into two

major headings; the "limitation of Armament," and "Pacific and Par
Eastern Questions."

Under the former were three subheadings;

"Limita

tion of Naval Armament"; "Pules for control of new agencies of warfare";
and "Limitation of land armament."

Under the latter heading were

"Questions relating to China," to Siberia, and, to the mandated Islands
O *3

of the Pacific.

As the agenda was being circulated, Prance and Great

Britain requested explication of "new agencies of warfare" and were told
that these were gas, submarines, and airplanes.

Japan accepted the

agenda on October 17 and stipulated that it retained the right to raise
OI
questions not covered in the agenda at the conference.
89
In preparing for the conference, the American delegation
decided to make its top priority the limitation of naval armaments and
notquestions concerning the Pacific

and Par East.

The reasons for

this, states Buckley, was that this topic was more concrete and had a
direct effect on the taxpayer1s wallets.

Par Eastern problems, in turn,
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La Matin (France), 13 July 1921, quoted in Ichihashi, p. If?.

The Agenda can be found in C. L. A., p. 10, or in Buell,
pp. 150-51, Fn. 23.
^^Buckley, p. I4I.
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The American delegation was headed by Charles Evans Hughes,
with Elihu Root, Senator H. C. Lodge, and Senator Underwood as members.
Great Britain1s delegation was headed by Lord Arthur Balfour, with Lord
B. Lee as an important member. Japan’s delegation was headed, in actual
ity, by Baron Kato Tomashaburo, not to be confused with Admiral Kato,
the. Minister of the Marine. The French delegation was headed by Premier
Briand, later Rene Viviani. For a complete listing of all participants
and staffs, see C. h. A. , pp. I2-J4I.
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were "mysterious."

The United States1 plan took a great deal of prepara

tion to formulate.

The delegation was suspicious of the Japanese, and

decided initially to call for a capital ship advantage of 2:1 over
Japan, and equality with Great Britain.

The Navy’s input was to say that

it needed either to have the Anglo-Japanese Alliance quashed, or a
navy as large as that of Great Britain and Japan combined.

Hughes

finally devised a proposal which would scrap construction programs of
the major naval powers and insure a ratio of 10:10:6 for Great Britain,
the United States and Japan.

86

The Washington Conference officially opened on November 12, 1921,
with Charles Evans Hughes as permanent chairman.

At the opening session

Hughes welcomed the delegates and quickly stated that to the United
States, naval disarmament was the top priority of the conference.

He

reiterated the principles articulating the need to disarm as stated in
the Czar’s Rescript of 1899> the United States’ desire for a limit of
armaments in 1907, and read the resolution for disarmament which had been
passed by the 1907 Hague Conference.

He went on to say:

What was convenient or highly desirable before
.is now a matter of vital necessity. If there
is to be economic rehabilitation, if the longings
for reasonable progress are not to be denied, if
we are to be spared the uprisings of peoples made
desperate in the desire to shake off burdens no
longer endurable, competition in armament must
stop.87
He continued by stating that in order for arms limitation to work, "all"
must sacrifice in reality.

With this introduction, he then surprised

the entire conference with several broad and innovative proposals on how
these sacrifices should be accomplished.
^Buckley, pp. Ij.9-56.

^C. L. A. , p. 56-
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He "began "by proposing a 10 year "holiday1'
of capital ships.

on the construction

He further stated that since it was fairly accepted

that capital ship tonnage was the "measure" of the "relative strength
of navies," the proposal would rest primarily on capital ships.
fourprinciples

His

to guide the conference were:

C D That all capital ship "building
programs, either actual or projected, should
be abandoned;
(2) That further reduction would be made
through the scrapping of certain of the older
ships;
(3) That, in general , regard should be had
to the existing naval strength of the Powers
concerned;
(ij.) That the capital ship tonnage should
be used as the measurement of strength for
navies and a proportionate allowance of
auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.89
Hughes then proposed specific limitation programs for each of the major
naval powers.
He proposed that the United States scrap all of her capital
ships which were still under construction at the time of the conference,
no matter how far complete.

This amounted to, he stated, l£ capital

ships; including 6 battle-cruisers and 7 battleships under construction,
as well as two battleships already launched but not yet regarded as
complete.

This would amount to scrapping 6l8,000 tons of capital ships

which were under construction.

90

He also proposed that the United States

scrap all of her older battleships up to a certain date of manufacture.
This amounted to 15 battleships of 227,7^0 tons.

The total number of

Defined as a period in which there should be no further construc
tion of capital ships.
^C. L. A. , p. 60.
90

$332 million had already been spent on these 15> ships.
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capital ships proposed for destruction was 30, equal to an aggregate
81+5 ,71+0 tons.
Hughes then proposed that Great Britain halt further construction
on four new battleships currently in the planning stages, 91 and the
scrapping of 19 older capital ships.

The latter would total 1+11,375

tons, giving the British a total tonnage reduction of 583,375 tons.
Hughes then proposed that Japan abandon her Double-Eight Program,
and agree to scrap 3 battleships and 1+ battle-cruisers "not yet laid
down but for which certain material has been assembled."

This would

amount to scrapping 7 new capital ships with a total tonnage of 289,100
tons.

Next he proposed that Japan scrap 10 older capital ships with a

total tonnage of 159,828 tons.

This would make a grand total of 1+1+8,928

tons to be scrapped.
Of Prance and Italy he said:
In view of certain extraordinary conditions
due to the World War affecting the existing
strengths of the navies of Prance and Italy,
the United States does not consider necessary
the discussion at this stage of the proceedings
of the tonnage allowance of these nations, but
proposes it be reserved for the later consid
eration of the Conference.92
For all three major naval powers, then, the above would entail scrapping
66 capital ships with total tonnage of 1,878,01+3 tons.

When enacted,

the United States would be left with 18 capital ships of 500,650 tons;
Great Britain with 22 capital ships 93 of 60l+,i+50 tons; and Japan with
91

This Involved "a reduction of 1+ new capital ships not yet laid
down, but upon which money had been spent, with a total tonnage when
completed of 172,000 tons." C. L. A., p. 80.
92C. L. A., p. 80.
93A special allowance of i+ capital ships was given to Great
Britain due to the age of her on-hand vessels.
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10 capital ships of 299>700 tons.

The replacement tonnage was stipulated

as 5*00,000 tons each for Great Britain and the United States, and
300,000 tons for Japan.

Each country would be allowed to replace their

fleets after the 10 year holiday; but they could only replace a capital
ship after it was at least 20 years old.

For submarines, Hughes proposed

a limit for the United States and Great Britain of 90>000 tons, and
5>l+>000 tons for Japan.

In aircraft carriers, a limit of 80,000 tons

was proposed for Great Britain and the United States and i+8,000 tons
for Japan. ^
To Ichihashi, Hughes’ proposal "electrified the calm session;
some [delegates] were shocked, some were even alarmed, but others were
pleased."

g<

To Buell, the reason for this shock, as well as the pleasure,

was that Hughes had "presented an actual workable plan" to the conference. 96
At the Second Plenary Session on 15> November, all powers agreed
"in principle" to Hughes’ proposal, but at various subcommittee meetings,
debate over the ratios ensued.

Admiral Kato requested that changes in

the proposal be made "with regard to the tonnage basis for replacement
Q],
C.
L. A. , p. 66. Replacement tonnage was the total tonnage
allowed once all ships in existence in 1921 had "worn out."

qC

Ichihashi, p. 35*

96
Hughes presented the following account of his reasons for
presenting the proposals as he did. "It was evident that each country
would have its own conception of its needs; that general considerations
of needs and aspirations could be brought forward by each power in
justification of some hypothetical relation of naval strength and the
result would be an endless discussion; getting us nowhere. Looking at
the question from every angle, I found no hope of success unless the
three great naval powers, United States, Great Britain, and Japan, were
willing to end their competition by a determination to stop now. See
David J. Danelski and Joseph S. Tulchen, eds., Autobiographical Notes of
Charles Evans Hughes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 243.

Ik
of the various classes of vessels."
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He requested that because of her

geographical proximity, Japan should receive a better ratio than the
10:10:6 proposed by Hughes.

This request went to a technical subcommittee

headed by Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy.

Kato’s arguments were "national security" on the one hand, and a

charge that Hughes’ figures on completed capital ships was wrong on the
other.

Kato concluded by saying that Japan "considers it impossible

to provide for her security and defense with any force modified so that
98
the relative strength of the three navies will be 10-10-7."
Certain Japanese cables of Japanese intentions at the conference
are most revealing in the matter of the capital ship ratio.

A cable

sent on November 28from Tokyo instructed the Japanese delegation to
give in on the 10:7 ratio deadlock.

It stated that "it is necessary to

avoid any clash with Great Britain and America, particularly America,
in regard to the armament limitation question."

The cable further

stated that if the Americans did not agree to a 10:7 ratio, the delega
tion was to attempt a 10:6.5 ratio.

As an absolute minimum, the cable

went on to say, the delegation was to accept a 10:6 ratio, but then only
with "a guarantee to reduce orat least to maintain the status quo of
Pacific defenses. . . ."99
Yamato Ichihashi attests to the above as true, and gives the
reason for the Japanese capitulation.

He quotes Baron Kato as saying:

The costs of armament have now become so
heavy that they are a burden hampering productive

9 1C. L. A., p. 106.
98
Quoted in Ichihashi, p. I4.8.
99
Cable No. 13> November 28, 1921, Tokio to Washington, quoted
in Yardley, p. 313.

activity throughout^the world. . . . The
limit of reduction to which Japan will go
is marked only hy the necessities of her
security. . . . Up to the present Japan
has had fears which have caused her to
continue building [her fleet]. . . • [She]
had hoped that the conclusion of the Great
War would bring a cessation of construction,
but as the United States, with her unassail
able position, deemed it necessary to
continue her naval development, no alternative
was permitted to Japan.100
Kato went on to say that it never had been Japan’s intention to ’’rival”
the United States and Great Britain in naval strength, because Japan's
naval program had ’’always been defensive” and would continue to be.
What he was looking for at the conference, he stated, was a "complete
understanding that will terminate distrust and suspicion.
The final agreement reached, then, was that the ratio of
10:10:6 was acceptable to all parties.

Second, all agreed to maintain

the status quo on fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific.

Third,

Japan was allowed to keep the brand-new ship, the Mutsu, and would, in
turn, scrap the Settsu (an older battleship).

The number of ships which

Japan would retain was 10; the number in Hughes' original proposal.
The retention of the Mutsu made a total difference in tonnage of 13,600
tons; thus, giving Japan total tonnage of 313>300 tons.

Fourth, in

order to preserve the equality in "efficiency," the United States was
allowed to complete the Colorado and Washington, and scrap the Delaware
and North Dakota (older ships).

This would leave the United States with

18 ships, but would increase her total tonnage to 525,8£0 tons.

Fifth,

Great Britain would be allowed to build two new ships, but they would
^^Quoted in Ichihashi, p. 2+0.
Ibid.

have to scrap 1* older ones. This would leave Great Britain with 20
■
.
- '?
capital ships of 582,050 tons. Sixth, maximum tonnage for each replace
ment vessel would be placed at 37,000 tons, and the replacement ratios
were now raised to 525,000 tons for the United States and 315>000 for
Japan.

Lastly, the 10 year naval holiday was declared.

102

The above results were then presented to France and Italy with a
proposal that they retain a ratio of 1.75* or 175*000 tons each.
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Admiral de Bon of France, however, delivered a speech in which he stated
that because of her vast colonial network and her dependence for raw;
materials on these colonies, a large French navy was a necessity.

He

further stated that France’s "desire" was to replace her current capital
ships with 10 new ones of 35*000 tons each.

In view of this, she needed

to have a replacement tonnage of 350,000 tons minimum.

Hughes, there

fore, sent a wire to Briand (who had returned to Paris by this time) ,
in which he stated that Great Britain, Japan, and the United States had
agreed to scrap 68 "capital fighting ships" totaling 1 ,861,000 tons.
He also pointed out that Italy had agreed to a small tonnage requirement,
and then suggested that "the attitude of France will determine the
success or failure of these efforts to reduce the heavy burden of naval
a r m a m e n t s . H e went on to point out that if France's portion was in
the same ratio as the United States’ reduction, then by all rights France
should be allowed only 102,000 tons.

The 175*000 tons, in actuality, was

in?
C. L. A., pp. 1+1*6-52.
103
Italy had already expressed her desire to have naval numerical
equality with France. To the end she had agreed to limit her navy to
175*000 tons of capital ship as long as France did likewise.
lOl+Teiegram from C. E. Hughes to P. Briand, December 16, 1921, in
C. L. A., pp. l+5!*-58.
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an allowance for France to increase her present tonnage (she had only
161).,000 tons 'then .available).

Briand’s answer was to agree on the 1.75

ratio on capital ships hut to stipulate no further limitation on other
ships.

He stated that "As regards naval armament, it is not the offen

sive, hut solely the defensive, point of view with which France is
preoccupied.” He therefore agreed to the 1.75> or 175,000 ton limit,
for France on capital ships, hut went on to say:
But so far as defensive ships are concerned
[light cruisers, torpedo hoats and submarines],
it would be impossible for the French Govern
ment . . . to accept reductions. . . . The
dominating idea of the Washinton Conference is
the restriction of offensive and costly naval
armaments. But I do not believe it to be any
part of its program to restrict a nation which,
like France, has a large extent of coasts and
numerous distant colonies, in the means
toC
essential to its communications and security.
The French attitude began what Buell calls ”the submarine contro
versy.” Hughes’ original proposal had proposed tonnage limitations of
90,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain, 5^4,000 tons for
Japan, and it had not mentioned France and Italy.

All of the then

existing tonnages of the major powers, however, were below these figures
at the start of the conference.
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Lord Lee, Britain’s First Lord of

the Admiralty, stated that it appeared "strange” that the proposed
"limit" on submarine tonnage would allow nations to build more to reach
the stated level.

In addition, he stated that the allowance was particu

larly odd in view of the moral objections to the uses of the submarine
10^

Telegram from P. Briand to C. E. Hughes, December 18, 1921,
in C. L. A. , pp. ij.98-60.
106

The figures of existing total tonnages of submarines differed
in British and U.S. calculations. American figures were considered more
correct. They were; United States— 95,000 tons, Great Britain— 82,iu6JL|.,
tons, France— 142,850 tons, Italy— 20,228 tons, and Japan— 31^00 tons.
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in World War I.

In the war, he went on, Geman submarines had sunk at

least 12,000,000 tons of merchant shipping, worth over $1,100,000,000
not including the cargoes.

He further stated that 20,000 noncombatants

had been killed by drowning.

He then called for total abolition of all

submarine fleets in existence, starting with England's own 100 vessels.
The French delegate then stated France1s position.
France believes that the submarine is
the only weapon which at present permits a
nation scantily supplied with capital ships
to defend itself at sea. For France, there
fore, the submarine is an essential means of
preserving her independence which she can not
give up, especially in view of the sacrifices
to which she has been asked to consent in the
matter of capital ships.^ 7
At the next meeting, Admiral de Bon presented a lengthy speech stating
-that France would not abolish the submarine under any circumstances, as
it was an especially effective defensive weapon for those nations without
a large navy.

Its low cost, he went on to say, made it much the more

valuable, especially when compared to capital ship construction.

After

further lengthy explanation, he concluded that "90>000 tons is the
absolute minimum for all the navies who may want to have a submarine
force."108
Great Britain's reply was to point out that France had stated
that she could not disam her land forces because of her fear of Germany
(to be discussed below). However, the British spokesman went on to
suggest that submarines could not protect France from Germany; therefore,
Britain's only conclusion was that the submarines were to be used against
1Q7C. L. A., p. J+86.
108
Ibid. , p. 5l8.
to p. 518.

De Bon's address on submarines is from p. 501}.
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Great Britain.
The representative from the United States urged that abolition
be dropped, and a consideration of tonnages and numbers ensued.

Great

Britain, however, remained concerned with French submarines attacking
her ’’lifeline” of merchant ships.

In an attempt to ameliorate the

impass, Elihu Root introduced several resolutions to attempt to state
in simple terms the moral standards to be used by submarine commanders
in order to ease the trepidation of Great Britain.

One such resolution

stated:
The Signatory Powers recognize the practical
impossibility of using submarines as commerce
destroyers without violating the requirements
universally accepted by. civilized nations for
the protection of the lives of neutrals and
noncombatants, and to the end that the prohibi
tion of such use shall be universally accepted
as a part of the law of nations, they declare
their assent to such prohibition and invite all
other nations to adhere thereto. 1-09
Italy, Japan, and France referred the matter to their governments for
instruction.
On 30 December, Lord Lee, while awaiting the governments1 return
on the above, read into a speech he was delivering an article written
by Capitaine de Fregate Castex in the Revue Maritime of January, 1920."^^
At the time of these articles, Lee stated, Castex was chief of an impor
tant bureau in the French Naval Staff.

He was now Chief of Staff to the

Admiral of the Second Division in the Mediterranean, and was to be the
principal lecturer at the next year’s French Navy’s Senior Officers
Course.

At first, Lee said, Castex defended Germany’s use of the
109C. L. A., p. 596.

^^Revue Maritime was an official publication of the French Naval
General Staff.
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submarine in World War I.

At the end of the article, Lee quoted Castex

as having stated, "After many centuries of effort, thanks to the
ingenuity of man, the instrument, the system, the martingale [the sub
marine] is at hand which will overthrow for good and all the naval
power of England."'*''^

Lee now called on the French government to dis

claim these remarks, and to do so by agreeing to accept the Root
Resolutions.

France did apologize and, as a face-saving device, reluc

tantly accepted the resolutions in their entirety.

This was a victory

for Great Britain, for the submarine was prohibited from acting as a
"commerce destroyer."
The problem of land armaments was also discussed at the conference.

In 1921, France had the largest land army in the world,

she was reluctant to reduce her forces at all.

112

but

The problem, said Buell,

was that a sea power felt very reticent about giving up ships while land
armies were at a high level.

In addition, France’s alliances with

Belgium and Poland made her a very potent force on the continent.

As

Buell saw it, this was a policy of "Armed Peace," and it was forcing
Europe to continue in "a passive state of war."

It appears, as Buell

also suggests, that when Briand came to the conference,
mandate with him."

he

"brought

one

That was to tell the world of France1s particular

problems in Europe which prohibited her disarming. 113
In a speech on November 21, 1921 (at the Third Plenary Session),
Premier Briand set forth France's position.

Portraying helplessness,

111
■
C. L. A., p. 652. Lord Lee was quoting from Capitaine de
Fregate Castex's article entitled "Synthese de la Gueire Sous-Marine,"
Revue Maritime (January, 1920).
112

Buell’s figures show France with 818,000 men, Poland— 1*50*000,
Japan— -300,000, England— 215,000, U.S.— 175*000, Germany— 100,000.
11^Buell, p. 203.
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he told the audience that he would desire nothing more than being able
to state that "we come prepared to make the greatest sacrifices; our
country is safe; we lay down our arms and, in so doing, we rejoice in
helping to lay the foundations of a permanent peace."

But, he went on

to say, "Unhappily we can not do this. . • • We have not the right to do
it."

His point was, as he further explained, that
It takes two to make peace: yourself and
your neighbor. To make peace— I speak from
the standpoint of land armament— it is not
enough to reduce armies and to decrease the
munitions of war. That is the material side
of things. There is another consideration. . . .
A nation must also be surrounded by . . . an
atmosphere of peace; disarmament must be
moral as well as material. • . . In Europe • • *
there are still, alas, grave elements of
instability, conditions of such a character
that France is forced to look them in the face
and to measure their consequences from the
point of view of her own safety.
Briand went on to say that Prance could not possibly disarm

until Germany had a change in her philosophy of war and reduced her
army.

Her army of 100,000 as then presently constituted, said Briand,

was made of non-commissioned and commissioned officers from her old
regular

army.

This would, therefore, forma nucleus for a new,great

army whenever Germany decided to have one.

For Prance's safety, he

stated, she could not possibly disarm her land forces.
Japan was generally pleased with the stance France took on land
armaments.

A report of Major General Tanaka on Briand*s plea was

deciphered by Yardley.

In this report Tanaka stated, "It is the feeling

that through Briand’s fight Japan without any effort has achieved a
llj4C. L. A., p. 116.
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large part of its objective.”

In public, Great Britain showed

sympathy for Prance’s predicament, but privately was very hostile.

In a

telegram to Lord Balfour, Lloyd George stated, "Europe, led by Prance,
was again becoming an armed camp."

He also stated that the statistics

used by Briand (in his speech citing the threat of Germany) were "faked
and d i s i n g e n u o u s . G e o r g e thought that Prance was in no danger of a
German invasion.

Nevertheless, the subject of land armaments was, for

all intents and purposes, dropped from consideration at the conference.
The subject of aircraft carriers was also discussed.

The

original Hughes proposal had limited aircraft carriers to 80,000 tons
for the United States and Great Britain, and lj.8,000 tons for japan.

On

December 30, 1921, it was proposed that Prance and Italy be limited to
28,000 tons.

The Italian delegate quickly pointed out that with this

provision Italy would only be allowed one aircraft carrier of 27,000
tons.

He then stated that if the carrier was either in dry dock or

sunk, Italy would find herself without a ship of that type.

Italy then

asked that it be allowed a tonnage allowance high enough to grant it
leeway to have two such vessels (or 5U>000 tons).

In addition, Italy

asked for the right to have parity with the allowance granted to any
other Mediterranean Power, if this other power was to be allowed over
51+,000 tons.
France followed the same logic, but also requested a third
carrier because of her colonial possessions, for a total of 60,000 tons.
Japan stated that she could construct only one and one-half carriers with
116
Report of Major-General Tanaka from Washington to Tokio,
quoted in Yardley, p. 311*
ll6
Butler, Telegram from Lloyd George to Lord Balfour, November 27,
1921, P. 0. A8763/18/U6 9 quoted in Buckley, pp. 105-6.
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her allowance and this, Admiral Kato concluded, would not he enough.
He stated that Japan also needed three carriers, but unlike France he
asked for the maximum size of 27,000 tons each, or a total tonnage of
81.000 tons.

In view of these requests, Hughes noted that a ratio of

10:10:6 could be established by giving Great Britain and the United
States a 135,000 ton allowance, Japan an 81,000 ton limit, and France
and Italy a 60,000 ton limit.

All powers agreed to this.

117

In 1921 France had the largest air force in the world,
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but

after she had refused to limit her army and had threatened to build
capital ships and submarines, the British concluded that the French
were aiming their air force at the British Isles.

In view of this

Great Britain clamored for some peacetime restriction on manufacture of
aircraft.

After numerous meetings, however, a committee only managed

to agree that it was "not practicable" to limit commercial or military
aircraft in any way; and that the question of adaptation of rules of
warfare to aircraft should be reserved for another conference to be
held sometime in the future.

119

The treaty of the limitation of armaments was signed at the end
of the conference by Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy,
and Japan.

Article IV set capital ship replacement tonnage at 525,000

for the United States and Great Britain; 315,000 tons for Japan; and
175.000 tons for Italy and France.

Article V established a 35,000 ton

limit on capital ships, and Article VI established a limit in the caliber
117C. L. A., pp. 670-78.
Il8
France had 1,722 military aircraft, Great Britain— l,0l;8,
U.S.— 537, Italy— b S h f Japan— 537* Figures from Buckley, p. 121.
119C. L. A . , p. 790.
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of gun on these ships as not greater than 16 inches (I4O6 millimeters).

Article VII established the aircraft carrier limit of 135,000 tons for
the United States and Great Britain; 60,000 tons for France and Italy;
and 81,000 tons for Japan.

Articles IX and X established that the

tonnage limits on aircraft carriers was to be 27,000 tons and the gun
size was established as 8 inches (203 millimeters) or less.

Article XI

stated that all vessels other than capital ships to be held or constructed
by the agreeing powers must be 10,000 tons or less with a gun size of
8 inches or less.

The treaty also listed the ships and their tonnage

which may have been retained by each country.

It further stated that a

10 year holiday would be undertaken, and only after 10 years could
capital ships and aircraft carriers, which were at least 20 years old,
be replaced.

The treaty was to last until December 31 > 1936, and a two

year notice had to be given before the treaty could be abrogated.

120

A treaty concerning the use of submarines and poisonous gases
was also passed.

Article I stated that merchant vessels had to be

ordered by the submarine commander to submit to a search.

Crews and

passengers had to be set to safety before the merchant ship could be
destroyed.

Also, if the merchant ship failed to submit to search, it

could be destroyed.

Article III stated that if the above were to be

violated, the submarine commander would be considered a pirate.

Article

IV prohibited the use of submarines as commerce destroyers (a ship engaged
in the wanton destruction of merchant vessels).

Article V prohibited the

"use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous
liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the
general opinion of the civilized world. . . . "
ipo
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Ibid., pp. 1573-1601;.

Ibid. , pp. l60l;-10.

Finally, in the realm of arms limitation, a resolution entitled
"Resolution for a Commission of Jurists to Consider Amendment of Laws
of War" was passed.

This resolution proposed that a commission be

established with power to consider:

l)

If rules of International Law

presently in existence covered all changes in "methods of attack or
defense . . • of new agencies of warfare" since the 1907 Hague Conference; and 2)

If not, then what rules should be adopted.
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In conclusion, it appears that the Washington Conference was
called because of several reasons; not all dealing with armaments.

A

particular reason for the conference, the "causal factor" if you will,
does not seem to be present.

Many reasons intertwine, reinforce each

other, even come together; but the impact of each is difficult, if not
impossible, to measure.

The reasons themselves are almost as hard to

'define.
It does not appear? that there were any specific weapon innova
tions during the period preceding the conference.

The submarine and the

airplane, the "novel" weapons discussed at the conference, had been in
existence for quite a few years prior to the conference.

World War I,

however, had shown the immense killing potential of these two weapons
systems, and both were still at the beginning of their evolutionary
process.

As the costs of the older mainstay of the fleet, the capital

ship, reached new heights, the burdens of continuing with the programs
for further construction of these vessels were seen as oppressive.
Perhaps, as several authors suggest, the idea of arms was only a
facade to cover the real reason for the conference:
to abrogate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
1 OP

Ibid., p. 161+0.

the British desire

The reasons for this are not
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the subject of this chapter, but a superficial view would indicate that
this was entirely likely.

Japanese imperialism, as perceived by Great

Britain, most certainly caused the British government to reconsider
the reason for the alliance in the first place.

By 1921 Germany was

defeated and Russia was still undergoing the throes of rebellion.

The

latter appeared weak and of no major consequence to British holdings in
East Asia.

The alliance appeared to be a cover for Japan's ambitions,

however, and a potential threat if Japan and the United States were to
engage in war.

There still were advantages, however, and if Great

Britain was to abrogate the obligations of the alliance, and yet still
retain these advantages of security for British interests in Asia and the
Pacific, then perhaps a conference which could end in a new pact of
some kind would be advantageous.
Japan, on the other hand, did not appear to want a halt to the
alliance and, therefore, was reluctant to enter into a conference on
Pacific and Asian problems.

They were, however, in very deep financial

straits as a result of their fears of the United States, which were
driving them in an attempt to retain at least a 10:7 ratio with America’s
1916 naval program.

To continue to attempt to gain this ratio, however,

could have bankrupted Japan.

A limitation in armaments, on the other

hand, could halt the construction of the expensive capital ship, and
perhaps the slack could be taken up by an investment in the submarine;
i.e., witness Kato’s desire to increase Japan's submarine force to 15>0
ocean-going submarines.

To Japan, arms expenses appeared to be the

motivating force.
To the United States, no special reason appeared sufficient to
drive her to a disarmament conference.

Harding initially spoke of a
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conference on disarmament, but had not pushed the subject, and even
had opposed the first Senate resolution for such a conference*

He

appeared to be about to oppose the second, but capitulated for some
reason, and allowed the resolution to pass without opposition.
The cadi for negotiations from the United States was initially
for a conference to discuss naval arms limitation, particularly capital
-,.. ships. If, Japanese imperialism was a definite cause in American eyes
... for a conference, it does not appear to be corroborated anywhere.

In

■ the United States, however, there does appear to have been a moralistic
and perhaps naive desire to halt armaments.

The desire for naval

-supremacy does not appear especially strong, especially after the war;
but the concern with domestic priorities does.

In any event, the

United States appeared to be concerned with reduction of the arms costs
as a primary motivator for the conference.

Economically, as well as

militarily, she was as well off, if not more so, than any other nation.
She was able to fulfill national security obligations with the capital
ships she presently had, the submarine, and the airplane; therefore,
she saw no need for a race with capital ships.
In the final analysis, the Washington Conference of 1921-1922
was called for various reasons, none of which appear to have been a
decisive force for all concerned.

Costs and security, however, appear

to be common perceptions of all nations involved.

CHAPTER IV
THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, PHASE I (SALT I)
PART I
Introduction
"SALT,’1 says John Newhouse, "is perverse; it enlists our curios
ity, yet discourages comprehension."^

Its language is in terms of the

technical, yet, in essence, it is political in the sense of involving
decisions which affect allocations of resources, for both external and
internal priorities.

These two aspects of SALT, the political and the

technical, are intertwined in such a way that it is difficult if not
impossible to explain them separately.

Basic to an understanding of

SALT is the recognition that technology, in the form of weaponry in
this case, is a political asset to be used by one nation at the expense
of another.

In the case of SALT, weapons technology appears to have

brought the United States and Soviet Union to the point of wanting some
type of limitation agreement (witness the peripheral agreements on
hot-line, test-ban, and non-proliferation) , but the political utility of
weaponry causes both nations to resist' a limitation.
agreed upon, as it was in SALT I,

2

If a limitation is

each nation utilizes other qualitative

weapon innovations as "hedges" 3 in order to "steal a march" on its
^John Newhouse, Cold Dawn, the Story of SALT (New York; Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, 1973)> p. 1.
2

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are commonly called SALT.

3"Hedge" is a term used to denote one nation's attempt to protect
itself qualitatively in weaponry while entering into agreements on quanti
tative limits.
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opponent.
By and large, however, there is agreement on the basic, under
lying rationale for SALT.

This is that SALT represents "a mutual need

to solemnize the parity principle"^:

a desire to acknowledge that both

sides accept the fact that each could destroy the other.

In essence,

"SALT is a political negotiation concerned with finding an equilibrium
in which the great powers feel secure.1'
Although basic agreement can be reached on the underlying
rationale for SALT, it is extremely difficult to find agreement on the
reasons for the actual onset of SALT.
is no

This, I believe, is because there

single factor causing SALT, and therefore it is an interplay of

what Thomas Wolfe describes as "strategic, military-technical, political,
psychological, economic, and bureaucratic factors • . . [which] all
6
influence . . . interests in the limitation of strategic armament.11
It is difficult to tell which factor is more important.

Some may

overlap others, and even the actors are not completely sure of the
greatest influence.

Even within each factor there are priorities, percep

tions, and nuances not discernible to the outsider.

The best anyone can

do, therefore, is to identify the possible factors influencing the onset
of negotiations in hopes of showing their interrelatedness , and perhaps
^"Strategic parity, as used by Walter Slocombe, is an abstract
term which denotes more than a numerical equality. It is "the link
between a nation's military (including nuclear) forces— a collection
of weapons systems with certain certain technical capabilities and
characteristics— and its political power and influence." Walter Slocombe,
"The Political Implications of Strategic Parity," Adelphi Papers No. 77
(May 1971): 2.

£

Newhouse, p. 5*

6
Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Interests in SALT," in SALT; Implications
for Arms Control in the 1970s, eds. William R. Kintner and Robert L.
Pfaltzgraff, Jr.(Pittsburg;University of Pittsburg Press, 1973)? p. 21.
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to suggest that one "reason" is more probable than another.
PART II
Soviet Attitudes Towards Arms Control, and Factors Influencing
the Soviet Decision to Enter into SALT
It appears that Soviet policies on arms control and nuclear
weapons in the post-World War II period have been executed with a parti
cular goal in mind:

the attainment of at least strategic nuclear parity

with the United States.

The methods used to attain this goal have been

a matter of controversy within the Soviet Union.

In fact, as Lincoln

Bloomfield argues, "the significant source of Soviet arms control policy
7
is to be found in *trade-offs’ among several key underlying factors" :
both internal— the bureaucracy and the economy, and external— the inter
national environment.
Internal Setting
The decision to enter into SALT has reflected the views of the
foreign affairs intelligentsia, the scientific community, and the mili
tary.

They constitute specific "interest groups" within the Soviet

bureaucratic es tablishment.
For purposes of analysis, the foreign affairs intelligentsia
refers to the professionals concerned with foreign, policy.

They are

primarily found in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the intelligence
services, diplomatic schools, and the Foreign Affairs Department of the
Central Committee Secretariat.

This group had little influence during

the years of Stalin and Khrushchev, but since that time their power has
7
Lincoln P. Bloomfield et al. , Khrushchev and the Arms Raceg
Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament 1 9 5 U - 1 9 & U (Cambridge%
M. I. T. Press, 1 9 6 6 ), "p. 3-

91
grown and they might be suspected of playing a significant role in the
decisions leading to Soviet involvement in SALT.

This group does not

have a single view? "but, as Wolfe states, its "general orientation" has
"been "pro-negotiation" on arms control, with the stipulation that
"openings" would be exploited as they presented themselves.
The scientific community is an influential group because of the.
expertise it commands, particularly in the area of nuclear technology.
Its "general orientation," like that of the foreign affairs intelligent
sia, is pro-arms control.

Its political influence, however, is muted

because of the fear some of the Soviet leadership and the military have
that it may become too powerful.

8

The military is an organized agency of the bureaucracy, with
specifically defined interests and goals.

Its. importance is reflected

in the strategic functions it performs within the Soviet political system.
The Soviet Union craves great power status, and to this end perceives
the need for a large, sophisticated military establishment.

This

establishment, says Wolfe, is characterized by professional independence,
specialized knowledge, 9 and organizational autonomy.

Furthermore, it has

developed its own values, codes of conduct, and specific esprit de corps.
Next to the party organization, the military constitutes the most power
ful organized group in the Soviet Union.

This means that it has consider

able influence because it can insure that its "advice" is brought to bear
8Wolfe, pp. 30-32.
9An example of this is a story that Newhouse tells of one session
during the second round of SALT. M. Semenov, the chief Soviet delegate,
was comparing Minuteman silos with SS-9 silos, but was corrected by the
U.S. He had to be told by Colonel-General Ogarkov that the SS-9 silos
were much larger. Later Ogarkov told a United States delegate to please
not tell U.S. knowledge of Russian military matters to the civilian
members of the Soviet delegation.
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on the top leadership.

The military supports SALT, but is wary lest

something happen to hurt the Soviet military posture.

It did hot "call

the tune" for SALT, but did provide a conservative force on the eventual
Soviet position.
The decision to enter into arms control negotiations has been
difficult to take for the Soviet leaders.

Among many factors which

influenced its outcome, the economic considerations have played an
important role, albeit not a decisive one.
In the post-World War II period there do not appear to have been
any real economic pressures of the nature of an "urgent motive" driving
the Soviet Union to enter into arms control negotiations.

Beginning in

19l*5, the Soviet Union devoted a large amount of its .budget to research

and development' (R & D) activities in order to develop an atomic capabil
ity and thereby erase the American monopoly.

Even after the U.S.S.R.

exploded an atomic weapon in 191*9 > her expenditures remained high,
principally due to the Korean War.

After the war, defense expenditures

dropped somewhat, but increased in 1955*
1956 and 1957 (see table 2).

They were lowered again in

They grew rapidly after 1957?.with the

biggest jump in 1961.'*‘"L By 1962, defense spending was almost 1*0 percent
higher than in 1957*

In 1963 the published outlay for defense was a

full 10 percent more than in 1962.

The fact that agriculture was in

shambles in 1963 and civilian industry began to stagnate as more and more
engineers and scientists were pulled into the arms industry, probably
caused defense expenditures to drop in 1961* and 1965 ? but by 1966 this
spending was on its way to an all-time high in 1968.
^8Wolfe, pp. 3l+—36„
^^"Bloomfield, pp. 105~7«
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TABLE 2
DEFENSE ALLOCATIONS IN U.S.S.R. BUDGET FOR 1955-196812
(in Billions of Rubles)

195$
1956
1957
1958
1959
i960
1961
12

10.7
9.7
9.1
9. h
9-h
9.3
11.6

1962
1963
1962+
1965
1966
1967
1968

12.7
13.9
13.3
12..8
13. h
lit.5
16.7

Reproduced from a table in Thomas B. Larson, Disarmament and
Soviet Policy, I96I1-I968 (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969) >
p. 82.

9k
The actual influence of the economy on the decision to enter
into SALT, however, remains in doubt to this day.
are presented by Thomas Wolfe.

Two opposite views

One view,holds that economics played a

large role in the decision to opt for SALT.

This view maintains that

the Soviet Union needed “growth investment1’ for "meeting rising consumer
demands" and that strategic arms purchases took too many resources needed
for consumer industries.

Another view holds that "economic constraints

can no longer be regarded as a severe brake upon Soviet capacity and
willingness to compete strategically with the United States, and that
therefore the prime motivations behind Soviet participation in SALT must
lie elsewhere." 13
Wolfe says that the first view was used more extensively in the
first stages of SALT as the answer to why the Soviets decided to opt
for it, especially in light of the slowdown in the Soviet economy in
1967-1968; but if this was the correct view, he suggests, Soviet interest
in SALT should have declined altogether as the economy resurged in 1970.
The interest, however, remained high, thus indicating that the Soviet’s
main reason for SALT may have been other than economic.

Furthermore,

the statistics of the Five-Year Plan of February, 1971 j in which consumer
industry still retained a low percentage of the total production, even
with an economic upsurge, may indicate that the second view is more
■j]

reasonable.

As evidence for this, Wolfe cites the debate over invest

ment priorities which still raged during the SALT negotiations, with the
military faction carrying the most weight.

Thus it appears, as Wolfe

13Wolfe, p. 25.
The I97O plan showed consumer goods as a percentage of total
production as only 21;%. 'This had been raised to only 30% in 1971*
Heavy industry took the rest.

suggests, that "the Soviet leaders are prepared to devote at least as
large a proportion of the national income to military purposes as was
the case during the strategic buildup of the sixties— provided that they
consider such a level of military preparation necessary to support Soviet
interests," 1^

therefore, it appears that the economic factor is not

decisive.
In sum, as Thomas Larson aptly states:

"Soviet leaders as a

group are well-trained to resist acceptance of disarmament measures whose
attraction is mainly economic."

l6

Thus, the majority of economic

resource allocations, it is probable, are heavily influenced by the
strategic considerations which appear to affect Soviet security.
External Setting
Soviet perceptions of the international environment may have been
a most important influence in Russia’s decision to opt for a m s control
in general, and SALT in particular.
The period from 19l|5> to 195>U in Soviet strategic policy was
characterized by a drive to acquire atomic weapons, and arms control
was anathema to the leadership at this time.

The Soviet desire for

nuclear weapons, however, does not appear to have been motivated as much
by fear of the United States, as from the knowledge that the weapon was
of vital necessity in the Soviet’s drive to become a superpower.

As

Adam B. TJlam writes, "Absolutely nothing suggests that Soviet policies
in 19U5 were dominated by the fear of or were a reaction to America’s
possession of the atom bomb.”17
■^Wolfe, p. 28.

As a matter of fact, TJlam continues, it
"^Larson, p. 81.

17Adam: B. TJlam, The Rivals: America & Russia since World War II
(New York: Viking Press, 1971) > P« 95-
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was during1 this period that the U.S.S.R. solidified its control over
East Europe, blockaded Berlin, and demobilized her armed forces from
just over 11 million men in

1 9

b % 9 to 2.8 million men in 1948*

A Soviet

assumption during this period appeared to be that the United States
would not use the weapon, even for intimidation.
18
The 19U6 United States' plan (the Baruch Plan ) to turn over
atomic weapons to an agency of the United Nations for management was not
acceptable to Stalin, because of his suspicion that the "superagency"
created would be detrimental to Soviet interests.

He also knew that under

this plan. Russia would be denied nuclear know-how, but the United States,
though disarmed, would retain the knowledge.

His counterproposal, that

all atomic weapons be destroyed but with no inspection guaranteed, was
unacceptable to the United States, as he probably was certain it would
be.

In essence, says Ularn, Stalin was convinced of the absolute desir

ability of nuclear weapons and, therefore, embarked upon a program to
insure their development and acquisition.
able to explode a nuclear device by 1 9 b 9
of Soviet devotion to that goal. 19

9

The fact that Russia was
Ulam claims, is proof enough

The Soviet attitude towards the

West during this period was characterized by hostility.

Bloomfield

concludes that after Stalin's death, uncertainties, such as which side
would profit more from a strategic arms race, "combined with the as yet
unresolved questions of inspection and control, the fixing of ratios, and
Moscow's assessment of Western intentions, probably made comprehensive
*^The Baruch Plan was presented to the United Nations in 19U&.
See Trevor N. Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman, A Documentary History of Arms
Control and Bis armament (Dunn Lorins, Va.s. T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1973)?
pp. 301-8, for a full reproduction of the plan.
19See Ulam, chap. 4.
1
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disarmament appear infeasible in 1951j--*1956. • •

20

After 1956 > how

ever, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev appeared to become more agreeable .
to notions of arms control.

A softer line appeared, accompanied by a

shift toward accommodation with the West.

21

Khrushchev announced in February 1956, that war was no longer
inevitable and that in some cases the movement to Communism could be
accomplished by peaceful means.

This was intended to show that Soviet

Russia did not want military confrontation with the West.

22

Influencing

this accommodation was the fact that by 1951+ and 1955 the Soviet R & 3)
programs began to deliver their "fruits” in the form of new delivery
23
capabilities and larger warheads for its strategic arsenal..
In the period 1956 to 1962 several optimistic assumptions
concerning future Russian strategic power caused the leadership to
become very confident concerning Soviet nuclear capabilities.

This, in

turn, probably caused the Soviet TJnion to soften its approach to aims
control, at least until the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962.

One

reason for this optimism was that Russia successfully tested an ICBM in
1957 (before the United States), after which Khrushchev announced that
bomber forces, such as those belonging to the United States, were
becoming obsolete.

As the Soviets began to perceive that they were

reaching a position of relative parity with the United States (their
assumption combined with cries of "missile gap" in the United States),
they began to speak more seriously of arms control. At the Pugwash talks
90

Bloomfield, p. 10+.
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Ibid. , p. 17.

22
Leo Gruliow, ed. , Current Soviet Policies; A Documentary
Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and Its Aftermath (NewYork;
Praeger, 1957) j pp. 36-38.
^Bloomfield, p. 37*
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in Moscow in i960, the Soviet scientists asked the American delegation to
report to President-elect Kennedy that "the Soviet TJnion is serious
about disarmament"; and that its position was "not wholly propaganda."2^
After the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 exposed the idea
of Soviet missile superiority as a myth, the Soviets became quite
concerned about their vulnerability.

They reacted by becoming more

hostile, and their position on arms control hardened.

Although some

negotiations were still conducted on peripheral topics (hot-line agree
ment) , movement towards a comprehensive negotiation was halted for a
considerable period.

2E>

The Soviet strategic buildup after 1962 was not just the result
of the Cuban crisis, says Wolfe, but was the culmination of planning in
the late 195>0’s to increase nuclear forces in order to reach full parity.
When Khrushchev was finally ousted in October II4., 1961+y however, the
Soviet strategic forces were still very weak (consisting of only about
two hundred launchers); but initial steps for the deployment of the thirdgeneration SS-9 and SS-11 had been taken.

26

After Khrushchev was removed, the remaining leadership was
virtually the same as before, but its style changed, involving a differ
ent emphasis.

The "new" leadership accused Khrushchev of "subjectivism,"

"voluntarism," and impulsiveness.

He had been too addicted to "leaping

before looking" and to "bombast."

What the leadership would now empha

size, it said, would be group decisions, with "sobriety, caution, [and]
o]
Quoted in W. W. Rostow, "Introduction: the Politics of Arms
Control or How to Make Nuclear Weapons Wither Away," in Kintner, Pn. 6,
p. ix.
^Bloomfield, pp. 176-8£.

26Wolfe, p. 39-
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careful preparation.n27
In I96I4.-I966, the new leadership conducted a review of defense
policy and for a time new programming was in limbo.

At the Twenty-third

Party Congress in April 1966, however, Kosygin indicated that larger
defense expenditures were being programmed, with the emphasis on strate
gic forces.

In 1968 the Soviets modernized their submarine force with

new Y-class submarines.
In addition to perceptions of the West, it is almost certain that
internal rifts within the Communist camp affected Soviet actions towards
arms control.

As the Peoples1 Republic of China (PRC) in 1956 began to

diverge from the Soviet model of development and to take an independent
stance on other matters as well, the relationship between the two giants
became very antagonistic.

28

This hostility became more intense after

1957 9 especially when the Soviet Union refused to continue to provide
the Chinese with nuclear aid.

Nevertheless, exactly how this affected

Soviet arms control policy is debatable.

29

There is agreement that the dispute did exert some influence on
Soviet policies; that Soviet arms control policies following the removal
of Khrushchev probably were "framed” so as to avoid giving unnecessary
offense to China.

This meant that the Soviets were influenced, restrained

if you will, because all arms control decisions had to take the attitude
27
Quoted in Larson, p. 8.
28
Robert A. Scalapino, "The American-Soviet-Chinese Triangle:
Implications for Arms Control," in Kintner, p. li+3*
29
For a good discussion as to this debate, see Helmut Sonnenfeldt,
"The Chinese Factor in Soviet Disarmament Policy," and Morton H. Halperin,
"Sino-Soviet Nuclear Relations, 1957-1960," in Morton H. Halperin, ed.,
Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1967).
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and military posture of the PRC into consideration.

30

In sum, great power status via atomic weapon parity has probably
been

a constant goal of the Soviet

Union during the post-World War II

period; therefore, Soviet arms control policy is very concerned with the
military-strategic balance which exists at a given time.

This means

that arms control and disarmament policies are formulated with regard to
how they affect security and, therefore, they change with changes in the
military and strategic situation.

A prime concern is to avoid a general

war, but at the same time to pursue security in the form of parity.

The

actual timing of their arms control efforts, therefore, depends upon
both internal and external factors, plus one other, technology, which
will be discussed below.
PART III
American Attitudes to Arms Control, and Factors Influencing
the United States1 Decision to Enter into SALT
The arms control policy of the United States in the post-World
War II

period, generally speaking,

hasbeen one which allowed arms limita

tion to be discussed, but the proposals offered, however, have been only
those which would have insured continued United States superiority, if
not in actual on-hand forces, at least in technology.

Thus, the American

decision to enter into SALT was a combination of factors, both internal
and external, coupled with a strategic philosophy which allowed the
United States to accept strategic parity with.the. Russians.
In the mid-1960fs , for example, the United States' long-range
strategic strike: force was four or five times as large as that of the
Soviet Union.

In 1966~1967> however, the United States decided to place

^Sonnenfeldt, pp. 103-8.
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a quantitative ceiling on strategic weaponry, which allowed the U.S.S.R.
to move past U.S. strategic force levels in ICBMs and deliverable mega
tonnage by 1970 (see table 3).

This part will discuss the non-strategic

factors which possibly brought about that decision.
Internal Setting
The U.S. bureaucracy has been influential to the extent that it
functions as do bureaucracies in general:
form of options into the leadership.

by "funneling" inputs in the

From these, decisions are made.

Concerning arms control, the most influential agencies in the U.S.
bureaucracy are the State Department and the Department of Defense.

Of

the two, the Department of Defense has been the more conservative force,
and the State Department, via the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) , has been more inclined towards arms control.
ever, these two agencies have balanced each other.
a cautious, but pro-arms control policy.

All in all, how
This has resulted in

The bureaucracy’s main influ

ence, as with the Russian apparatus, however, is to help set the para
meters of decision making and perhaps to affect the timing of negotiations,
but overall its contribution was not decisive. 31
Public Opinion and Congress, on the other hand, have generally
adopted the "guns or butter" conception of defense.

Until Vietnam they

were mainly conservative in their views of military spending; i.e., the
public and Congress, nurtured on anti-Communism, accepted government
requests for military and weapons appropriations.
After

however, the public began to feel the pinch of

31Harland 33. Moulton, From Superiority to Parity; the United
States and the Strategic Arms Race, 19&1-1971 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1973)> PP. 270-75.
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TABLE 3
UNITED STATES AND SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL
STRATEGIC-STRIKE FORCE, 197032

U.S.

U.S.S.R.

(1,000)
(54)

(940)
(220)
(280)

Type
ICBMs
Small (SS-11, Minuteman)
Medium (SS~8, Titan II)
Large (SS-9)
Subtotal
SLBMs
Bombers
Total
Number of warheads carried
(approximate)
Deliverable megatonnage
(approximate)

•

•

•

1,054

1,440

656
55o

350
3.45

2,260

1,935

5,300

2,225

5,600

9,700

32
Chart in J. J. Coffey, "American Interests in the Limitation
of Strategic Armaments," in Kintner, p. 58.
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supporting the war in Vietnam, strategic forces and the Great Society
programs.

Defense "budgets, for example, went from $1|.6 "billion in

i960 to $1j9»9 "billion in 1965> $66 "billion in 1966, $70.6 billion in
1967, $75 billion in 1968, $81.1* billion in 1969> and to $82.3 billion
in 1970.^

As large as these expenditures were, they were declining as

a proportion of G. N. P.

The rapidly increasing total budget was

becoming oppressive.
However, due to the war in Vietnam, the percentage of the defense
budget devoted to strategic arms declined greatly from 1965 to 1968, as
compared to the percentage prior to 1965j and this was to decline further
by 1970-

Whereas in 1965> 13*8 percent of the defense budget was ear

marked for strategic forces and 9*8 percent for R & D, in 1970 the
percentages were 11.7 and 6.8 percent respectively. 35■
The attitude of the bureaucracy and Congress to arms control
became more positive as the 1960Ts drew to a close.

Whereas some agen

cies and congressmen urged caution in approaching any sort of negotiation
In 1967 a Gallup poll showed that 76% of Americans sampled held
either a "mildly unfavorable" or "highly unfavorable" attitude toward
Russia. In George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971
vol. 3- (New York: Random House, 1972) , March 8 , 1967 Poll. By 1969 ?
however, Vietnam had caused much of the Congress and the public to be
skeptical of "experts," and they began to pressure for more funds for
domestic needs. In an August 11*, 1969 poll? 52% of those surveyed felt
that the U.S. was spending "too much" on military and defense. Only 8%
felt that the U.S. was spending "too little." In Gallup, p. 2210. How
much influence public opinion had on the decision to opt for SALT is
highly debatable. In national security matters, public opinion has
mattered little. However, in this case public opinion may have influenced
Congress, which, because they control appropriations, did exert influence
on the government to decide on SALT.
■3 J

Charles L, Schultze et al., Setting National Priorities:
1972 Budget (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971)? P- 12.
35The Federal Budget; its Impact on the Economy. (New
/
York:
National Industrial Conference Board, 1969)> p. 12.

The

iou
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with the Soviet Union, others welcomed the advent of a spirit of detente
and urged SALT as an immediate step.
External Setting
In 19^1 John Poster Dulles set forth his ideas on the inherent
dangers which he and many others associated with world communism.

It

was his contention that the communists1 goal was to hecome locked in a
"death struggle" with capitalism.

Communism, then, was a diabolical

scheme designed to subjugate the entire world.

The Soviet Union, under

the guidance of a "fanatical Communist Party," was evil and bent on
"destruction, terror, and madness." 37

Since these views were widely

shared throughout American society, the conception of negotiating
seriously with Russia on its terms of total disarmament was conceived to
.be impractical.
This view began to give way after Stalin’s death in 1953 >
gradually moving towards detente.

In the United States after Khrushchev's

ouster in I96I4., "an air of cautious optimism about East-West relations"
appealed to evolve.

This was, says J. I. Coffey, "from an apparent

recognition of the new realities and an adjustment that reflects the
limits of U.S. power, . . . [and also] from a willingness to use that
power for negotiation rather than for confrontation."

This feeling was

reciprocated somewhat by the Soviet Union.
36 /
Detente is a nebulous term literally meaning a "relaxation of
tensions." It does not imply an "entente," but includes perceptions of
improving East-West relations. See Department of State, The Meaning of
Detente (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Office, June 1974)*
37
John Poster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1950) 9
pp. 2-10.
^Coffey, p. 6l.
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In essence, the lessening of tension in the international environ
ment provided a catalyst for the advent of SALT, "but it was not the
decisive factor.

The general statement which can he made is that with

out a relaxed environment SALT probably could not have taken place, but
without other factors, such as the economic and strategic-technological
(yet to be discussed), detente would not alone have caused SALT.

What

is important and, as Walter Slocombe suggests very relevant, is that
the United States would not have embraced strategic parity unless it did,
in America’s estimation, provide for security. 39

This, then, leads to

the most important factor urging SALT (on the United States’ side at
least):

the effect of technological innovations.
PART IV
The Technological Incentives for SALT
SALT is a political negotiation, but wrought with technological

considerations.^

Because nuclear weapons so drastically altered the

previously-held concepts of warfare, in the nuclear age atomic technology
becomes a tool which allows one nation to exert influence on another's
political decisions.

Technological innovations have the ability to

create feelings of insecurity in others, and if these innovations alter
the strategic power balance between antagonists, the psychology of the
nuclear age appears to cause the nation with the most powerful strategic
force to perceive that it is. in a position to exert more influence in the
world.

Ironically, the "lesser” power appears to accept its role of
39

See Slocombe, Fn. I4.

^Technological in the sense of weapons developments that affect
the strategic doctrine. Appendix A contains a brief summation of the
strategic concept of deterrence.

106
having less influence, although its ability to obliterate its opponent is
unimpaired.

Like Hertz and Avis, both nations strive to be "Number One"

in the strategic aims race, each attempting to halt the race once it
has reached a superior position.

Thus, it was only when both the

United States and the Soviet Union agreed to accept strategic parity as
the basis of negotiation that SALT was able to begin.

Part IV will

attempt to trace the evolution of parity, and the strategic, technolog
ical and military decisions which influenced the decision to begin
SALT.1*1
Uuring the period of the American nuclear monopoly, 19l+5-19U9>
the defense planners in the United States appeared convinced of U.S.
atomic superiority.

The Soviet explosion of an atomic device in 19li9>

followed by the Korean War in 1950» however, caused an urgent drive to
"regain" superiority in nuclear weaponry.

In 1950 > President Truman

decided to develop the hydrogen bomb (what Harry Moulton considers an
"exponential"^ jump in the technological sequence of nuclear weapons),
and this helped the United States to "spurt ahead."
The "H" bomb was a vast improvement over the "A" bomb, and it
was successfully tested in late 1952.

By 1955 the United States was far

superior to the U.S.S.R. in strategic delivery means (see table 1|). The
Soviet R & D efforts during this period which would dramatically alter
the strategic status quo in just a few years were being urgently carried
forth, however, and they culminated in another "exponential" jump, the
^Strategic-technological-military means simply that in the
nuclear age, one affects the other, and that it is almost impossible to
separate them completely.
)?
This means that a qualitative innovation so vastly changed the
strategic situation that the "have not" nation frantically attempted to
negate the feat in some manner.

TABLE k
STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS , 1955^

1000

bull
. J *

H1HUJ

» Bear

U.S.

Soviet

Medium-Range Bombers

^Chart in Bloomfield, p. 37•

TJ.S.

Soviet

Long-Range Bombers

ICBMs were only in R & D stages.

development of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (iCBM).

The

Soviet Union successfully tested this weapon in early 1957? "but the
United States was not able to duplicate that feat until December of
that year.^4
The Soviet ICBM test caused great concern within, the U.S. , and
several agencies and "think-tanks," including the Hand Corporation and
the Department of Defense, began to stress the vulnerability of the
United States’ Strategic Air Command (SAC).^

It appeared to defense

officials "to be the most dire threat to the security of the United
States in its entire history."^

The reaction of the United States was

to begin more intensive R & D efforts to "regain" superiority in strate
gic arms.

These efforts culminated successfully when a Titan I was

placed in operation by 1959 and the Minuteman and Polaris by the early
1960s.

The "Triad"

)7

was now in operation, and the United States saw

itself in a secure, superior strategic position.^
In I96I4.President Johnson began to make moves to reach agreement
on mutual arms reduction with the Soviet Union.

He wrote to Khrushchev

in 196i+ proposing that both nations destroy some of their older bombers,
and on March 19, 1961+, Adrian Fisher

(the Deputy Directorof the ACDA)

proposed that a number of U.S. B-l+7sand Soviet TU~l6s be destroyed at
the rate of twenty per month for twoyears.

In August, 1961+, the United

^Moulton, pp. 252-63.
means:

1+5SAC contained what was then the U.S. main nuclear delivery
the long-range bomber.
^Moulton, p. 263.
I7

Triad is the term to denote that the balance of the U.S.
strategic strength lies in ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers.
^Moulton, pp. 21-23.
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States proposed a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic
offensive and defensive weapons, and a ban against "novel" systems.

Both

proposals were rejected by Russia. h9
By the mid-1960ts, spending for TJ.S. strategic forces leveled
off and a tacit understanding was accepted in the defense circles of
Washington which allowed 639 as the ceiling figure for B-5?2 bombers.

It

was further stipulated that, they would be phased out as they became wornout (current figures show approximately I4.6O in commission).

This under

standing also called for deployment of a Minuteman force of up to 1,000
missiles and a maximum of ipL Polaris submarines.

With this understanding,

the United States reached its self-imposed ceiling of 105U ICBM launchers
in 1967.
During the 1960*s, the Soviet Union earnestly began to increase
its ICBM force.

In I96I4., for example, it only had approximately 200

ICBMs in soft sites, but as table 5 shows, this number was to greatly
increase by 19^7*
Strategically speaking, the U.S.S.R. bases its strategic doctrine
almost exclusively on ballistic missiles, particularly ICBMs (see table
5).

Its largest weapon, the SS-9 Scarp, is an expensive, liquid fueled

weapon, costing almost twice as much as the United States Minuteman.
The SS-9 gives the Soviet Union a credible first-strike capability,

<0

^Newhouse, p. 69.
£0
A first strike is defined as: "The launching of an initial
nuclear attack before the opponent attacked has used any strategic nuclear
weapons himself." See Glossary in Kintner, p. 1|25>. A first-strike
capability involves "the substantial elimination of the attacked nations
retaliatory second-strike force." A first-strike weapon, then, is simply
a very sophisticated, accurate, or large-yield weapon which gives one
nation the ability to destroy its opponents retaliatory, or second-strike
force. A second strike, then, is "the capability to absorb a surprise
nuclear attack, and survive with sufficient power to inflict unacceptable
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TABLE 5
STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS (OCTOBER 1, 1967)^1

United States
ICBM Launchers
Submarine Ballistic Missile Launchers
Intercontinental Bombers
Warheads

105U
656
697
1+500

U.S.S.R.
720
30
155
1000

damage on the aggressor*11 In U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the United States Antiballistic Missile Program, Hearings before the subcommittee on military
applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 90th Cong.,
1st sess., 19687"Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
before the United Press International editors and publishers, San Prancisco,
Calif., Sept. 18, 196? > "hereafter referred to as McNamara, "Remarks. . . ."
51Chart from Larson, p. 101+. The discrepancy in warheads is
due to the large number of U.-S. bombers.
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which would give to it the possibility of destroying much of the United
States’ Minuteman force.

When the United States learned in August, 1968

that the U.S.S.R. had begun to test multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV)
<2
for the SS-9j however, it became more concerned. Mow more warheads
■could be carried to the Minuteman fields, thus insuring more destruction.
The MRV development meant to many U.S. defense experts that the
Soviets would soon test a multiple independently, targeted re-entry
vehicle (MIRV).

An SS-9 with MIRV would increase the Soviet threat ten

fold, at least.

As few as three hundred SS-9s with six MIRVs apiece,

says Newhouse, might be able to destroy the entire Minuteman system on a
first strike.

By 1973 the U.S.S.R. had 288 SS-9s.^3
MIRV

MIRV and MRV have increased the amount of nuclear firepower
which can be delivered from one nation to another.

MRVs are warheads

which, once released by the launcher over enemy territory, scatter along
a single path and are not individually targeted.

MIRVs, on the other

hand, are released at different times, at different angles and are
individually targeted.

An excellent analogy is given by Newhouse.

states:
MIRV is a wondrous technology. The low-thrust
final stage of the missile is a bus. The bus,
pushed along by a single guidance and propulsion
system, carries all of the re-entry vehicles.
These it releases one at a time by changing
velocity and direction. Incredibly, these
adjustments actually define the path of the re
entry vehicle to its target. The bus follows a
meandering course, now zigzag, now rolling over
52
Ian Smart, "Advanced Strategic Missiles:
Adelphi Papers No. 63 (December 1969): 31*
53Newhouse, pp. 20-21.

A Short Guide,"

He
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and releasing a cloud of chaff, now perhaps
rolling again to fire another decoy, now
shifting directions and releasing a real
warhead.^
It is argued "by some the MIRY is a very destabilizing weapon
becausej in one qualitative jump, a nation's strategic firepower is
vastly improved.

The counting of forces no longer becomes practical

because one launcher does not equate another.

A MIRVd missile is "worth"

more than one without MIRY.
Others argue the MIRY is not as destabilizing as it would
appear, because even though it implies a first-strike capability against
land based missiles, it cannot threaten either bombers or submarines.
Nevertheless, it remains a major threat and is destabilizing at the very
least "simply because governments think it is."

The main problem with _

MIRV is, as Newhouse states, that since governments think in terms of
"worst case," the Soviets axe as afraid of the U.S. MIRV which was already
deployed, as the United States is afraid of the Soviet MIRV (for the SS-9
especially), which was (at the time of SALT) not deployed.
As will be shown, anti-ballistic missiles (AEMs) were easily
discussed at SALT and eventually limited.

MIRY, on the other hand,

appeared very ominous to the Russians and they refused to discuss it.
Since the Soviet Union had not developed the MERY technology by SALT,
they were not about to limit its use.

Their reason appears as Y. V.

Larionov, a noted Soviet scholar, states, that "What appears 'sufficient'
to one side can look like a desire for superiority to the other side." 5>7
^Tbid. , p. 28.

^Ibid.

^ Ibid., p. 29.

* h . V. Larionov, S. Sh. A. , No. 3, 1970 Moscow: S. Sh. A.
Ekondmika, Politika-Ideologioa, quoted in Newhouse, p. 31•
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ABM
The political implications of ABM (in the sense of security
c'o
considerations) are very involved and very/basic to SALT.
The idea of
an ABM force originated long Before SALT, but the U.S. decision to deploy
was deferred until 1967*

It was seen as a necessary system for security,

but it was also seen as a system which would weaken the strands of
deterrence.

If one side felt it could shore itself behind a wall of ABM,

it would be able to launch a surprise attack, ride out a retaliatory
attack and win a nuclear war.

ABM defense, as Jeremy J. Stone, a noted

expert on strategic doctrine states, is "pernicious, destabilizing, and
dangerous." 39

Nevertheless, the decision was made by both nations to

deploy ABM.
The two air defense systems developed by the Soviet Union were
Tallinn and Galosh.

Tallinn was an air defense system using SA-3 mis

siles , and was originally designed to cover the bomber routes.of approach
into Russia.
around Moscow.
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Galosh, on the other hand, was an ABM system
established
The deployment of Galosh, however, caused the United

States to fear that Tallinn might also be an ABM system.

As a result,

the United States earnestly began to step up its development of ABM and
MIRV (designed principally to maneuver through an ABM system).

U.S.

defense planners saw Tallinn and Galosh as steps taken to begin fortifi38
The ABM was not an "exponential"- technological breakthrough>
although it did utilize much of the technology learned over the years,
but rather it represented a dire threat to the deterrence theory.
39Jeremy J. Stone, Containing the Arms Race; Some Specific
Proposals (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1966) , p . 21.
30
ABM is defined as: "A defensive missile fired to intercept an
offensive ballistic missile." A ballistic missile isone which reaches
an altitude outside the earth's atmosphere, and falls back by force of
gravity. See glossary, in Kintner, p. 1*23.
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cation of Russian urban centers.
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Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara did not desire to deploy
ABM, however, and his concern developed into finding ways to block the
Soviet Union from its further deployment.

His views were presented in a

statement given before the House Armed Services Committee in 1966.

He

said:
It is a virtual certainty that the Soviets
will act to maintain their deterrent which
casts such grave doubts on the advisability
of our deploying . . . [our ABM] system for
the protection of our cities against the kind
of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they
could launch in the 1970's* In all probability,
all we would accomplish would be to increase
greatly both their defense expenditures and
ours without any gain in real security to
either side.°2
President Johnson, however, wanted the United States to have an
ABM system in some form.

A reason for this appears to be, as Newhouse

states, that "Johnson was . . . looking ahead to the 1968 elections.
Having helped mightily, to foster the notion of a missile gap in the late
1950s— an issue used to advantage against Nixon in the i960 elections—
/To
he obviously wished to avoid facing a Republican charge of an ABM gap."
At a meeting in the Texas White House on December 6, 19&6,
relates

Newhouse, the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) urged that the Presi

dent support an anti-Russian ABM defense of American cities.McNamara
had already cut the requested funds for the initial ABM procurement from
^Many U.S. intelligence agencies were predicting a large expan
sion of Galosh 'in I96I4.-I966.

62u.s.

Department of State, Statement of Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee.on the
Fy 1967~1971 Defense Program and 1967 Defense Budget, February 1966,
P* 53*
Newhouse, p. 8J+.

the next year’s budget; but at this meeting it was decided to restore
these funds in the amount of $375 million.
compromise:

McNamara then urged a

"A suggestion that the Administration hold off spending

the money, or making a firm decision on what type of ABM system to
deploy until the State Department had explored with Moscow the idea of
talks on limiting strategic arms, especially ABM's."^
McNamara next authorized Llewellyn E. Thompson, then leaving to
become Ambassador to Russia, to contact the Russians in order to suggest
negotiations limiting strategic arms.

As Newhouse says, "the days and

65
weeks that followed marked the precise beginning of SALT.”

Thompson

then contacted Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and emphasized talks on the
ABM.

Dobrynin, in turn, placed equal stress on some form of accord on

both offensive and defensive systems.

As a result of these .contacts,

President Johnson said on January 2lj., 19&7* in kis budget message to
Congress, that he would continue to develop ABM, but would "take no action
now" with respect to its deployment.
On January 25 > 1967> in testimony before a Senate subcommittee on
appropriations, McNamara stated the U.S. position on ABM.

He said:

We propose: (l) To pursue with undi
minished vigor the development, test and
evaluation of the . . . [ABM] system .
but to take no action now to deploy the
system. (2) To initiate negotiations with
the Soviet Union designed, through formal or
informal agreement, to limit the deployment of
antiballistic missile systems. (3) To recon
sider the deployment decision in the event ^
these discussions prove unsuccessful. . . .
^Ibid. , p. 86.

^Ibid. , pp. 86-87.
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U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Statement of
Robert S. McNamara, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations
January 26, 1967* 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967? P« 239*

116

When the Russians announced in February that they were deploying
an ABM system around Moscow, Secretary of State Bean Rusk replied that
ABM development by both nations would result in increases in offensive
missiles.

This, he said, could lead to "new plateaus of expendi-

tures . . . with no great change in the . . . strategic situation."

67

On February 18, Thompson told Kosygin that the United States was
willing to discuss limiting offensive systems also, and suggested that
the talks be held in Moscow.

On March 2, President Johnson announced that

Kosygin, in answer to a letter of 27 January, had agreed to meet with
the United States in bilateral talks on "means of limiting the arms race
in offensive and defensive nuclear missiles."

68

In 1967 at a meeting held at Glassboro, New Jersey, Kosygin took
a very hard attitude towards arms control.
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Bean Rusk, years later,

recalls that at Glassboro, President Johnson said in effect to Kosygin,
"'Just set a date and I'll have McNamara there in Moscow.

Rusk further

states that:
Kosygin' s problem was that he didn' t have, a
negotiating position. He clearly had no
authority to discuss limiting arms, least of
all ABM's. He replied, in effect: 'How can
you expect me to tell the Russian people they
can't defend themselves against your rockets?'
Nevertheless, as Rusk recalls, Kosygin did appear to be interested in
notions of stable deterrence, an interest which the Russians had not
shown before.

To Rusk, therefore, Glassboro "may have been the start of

^Quoted in Newhouse, p. 90*
^Ibid. , p. 91*
6q
On 17 June, 19^75 the PRC detonated its first thermonuclear
explosion, of at least 3 megatons. See Jonathan Pollack, "Chinese
Attitudes Towards Nuclear Weapons, 196)4.-9," China Quarterly, vol. 5>0.
(April-June, 1972) : 2l|7*
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SALT for the Russians.”

At this time, however, Johnson perceived that

a decision on whether or not to deploy ABM had to be made.

It was

McNamara who stated the Administration’s final position on ABM in an
address at San Francisco on September 18, 19.6?
In his address McNamara at first acknowledged that
The cornerstone of our strategic policy
continues to be to deter deliberate nuclear
attack on the United States, or its allies, by
maintaining a highly reliable ability to inflict
an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single
aggressor, or combination of aggressors, at any
time during the course of strategic nuclear
exchange even after our absorbing a surprise
first strike.'x
This was, he said, America’s "assured destruction capability," and this
capability, he went on to say, was vital for it was the "very essence"
of deterrence.

72

The problem was, he said, that even though the United States had
nuclear superiority at that time, the Soviet Union could still destroy
the United States, even after a U.S. first strike.

Furthermore, "either

side relating to the build-up of nuclear forces, be they either offen
sive or defensive weapons, necessarily trigger[s] reactions on the other
side, . . . [and it] is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that
fuels an arms race."

In any regard, he went on to say, the United States

did not want a nuclear arms race with Russia, but "if the only way to
prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining first-strike capability over us
70
Quoted in Newhouse, p. 95*
^McNamara, "Remarks. . . ."p. 105>, (see Fn. fi>0).
72
To deter by promised retaliation is to have an "assured destruc
tion" capability. To do so one needs a credible second-strike force.
Assured destruction is defined as "the infliction of an unacceptable
degree of damage upon an aggressor, even after absorbing a surprise
attack." Smart, p.
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is to engage in such a race," then the United States has the capability
and will to do so.

What was preferable, however, was "to come to a

realistic and reasonably riskless agreement with the Soviet Union" on
both offensive and defensive missiles in order to prevent this arms race.
All each side needed to insure, he said, was that both sides, after such
an agreement, retain an assured destruction capability. 73
The main point, then, was that the Soviet Union was deploying an
ABM system.

The question this brought up was whether or not the United

States should deploy it too.
rather than "heavy" system.

7J

He then argued for ABM, but as a "thin"
His rationale against any heavy system

was that it could "rather obviously be defeated by an enemy simply
sending more offensive warheads, or dummy warheads, than there are defen
sive missiles capable of disposing of them."
unnecessary.

Thus a "heavy" system is

A heavy system, besides being expensive and unnecessary,

would only serve to cause the Soviets to increase their offensive
capability.

As he stated:

"It is futile for each of us [U.S. and

U.S.S.R. J to spend $]+ billion, $[{.0 billion, of $1+00 billion— and at the
end of all the spending, and at the end of all the effort, to be x’elatively at the same point of balance on the security scale that we are
now." 7£>■
McNamara did not really believe in any ABM system, but capitu
lated to its proponents and agreed to back a "thin" anti-Chinese system.
A thin system could also be used as a bargaining counter, since the
^^McNamara, "Remarks. . . ."p. 109•
VJ
A "thin" system would provide minimal protection, primarily used
as protection against accidental launches and nuclear fire from the PRC.
McNamara, "Remarks. . . ." p. 110.
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Russians already had it.

But, in essence, "the United States launched

its ABM program because Washington felt pressed to do something,
sensible or not."

It appears the Johnson Administration felt that

ballistic-missile defense, especially defending
ICBM sites, was an option well worth exploring.
It was not, however, explored systematically and
dispassionately in 1966 and 1967- Washington
instead found-itself caught up in a wave of ABM
hysteria, and the decision, like so many others,
was not measured. It was driven by essentially
tangential concerns, among them: the failure to
start immediate talks with the Russians; the
pressure to appease members of Congress who
insisted on emulating the Russian example; the
understandable White House fear of ABM becoming
a solid Republican issue in 1968.76
When on 20 May 1968 First Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov,
in a speech at the United Nations, announced that his government was
"ready to reach an agreement on practical steps for the limitation and
consequent reduction of the strategic means for delivering nuclear
weaponry," Johnson was ready.

Talks appeared to be absolutely confirmed

on 27 June when Foreign Minister Gromyko announced to the Supreme Soviet
that the Russian leaders were then prepared to enter into talks concern
ing the "mutual limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of
delivery of nuclear weapons, both offensive and defensive, including
anti-ballistic missiles." 77
When Czechoslovakia was invaded by Soviet forces on August 20,
1968, however, the preparations for SALT stopped.

Dean Rusk describes

the U.S. feelings as he said:
The Russians, so far as we knew, were still
prepared to go ahead. We felt we could not.
Public Opinion in the United States and in the
^Newhouse, pp. 100-101
77Quoted in Newhouse, p. 103.
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West would not have comprehended a summit
meeting and the start of talks right after
the invasion. . . ."78
He went on to say that the idea of SALT was discussed again in November
at U.S. initiative, and the Soviets were agreeable.

President Johnson

wanted the negotiations to begin before leaving office; a notion that
was firmly rejected by President-Elect Nixon and Dr. Henry Kissinger.
In denying Johnson's request, they indicated that they wanted strategic
options to remain open and free from any residual policy of the Johnson
Administration.
At this time the Soviet Union appeared even more eager to begin
SALT.

It announced on inaugural day, January 20, 19^9> that the U.S.S.R.

was ready to "start a serious exchange of views" on a "mutual limitation
and subsequent reduction of strategic nuclear vehicles, including defen
sive systems."

The spokesman also stated that "when the Nixon Administra

tion is ready to sit down at the negotiating table, we are ready to do
so, too."^
Nixon's reply of January 27 indicated that he favored strategic
talks with the Soviet Union, but he tied the talks to the solution of
"outstanding political problems," like the Mideast.

He was attempting,

says Newhouse, to show that arms control was one of several issues, all
interrelated.

On February 13, Dobrynin told Secretary of State Rogers

that the Soviet Union was ready to go ahead with SALT as part of an
"era of negotiation" in which other areas, such as the Mideast, could be
discussed.
President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger perceived that with MIRV the
78
'ibid., p. 130.
79I U d . , p. 11+1.
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United States had greatly increased its counterforce capability, but
with this advantage also came the fear that when the Soviets deployed
MIRV, the size of their SS-9 would make the United States extremely
vulnerable*

This* then, caused the Nixon Administration to see itself

as having very few alternatives.

Without SALT the options were to

expand the United States1 strategic strike forces, or to strengthen ARM
in an attempt to attain superiority.

80

The latter option would "be

difficult if not impossible" to achieve, however, because of the re
sources; technology, industry, political system, and economy, available
to the U.S.S.R.

This would, as McNamara stated in 1967> "increase

greatly both their expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to either side."

8l

President Nixon did not foresee great dividends from expanding
the stike forces either.

On February 18, 1970) he stated his views as:

"Sharp increases in U.S. strategic nuclear forces might not have any
significant political or military benefit.

Many believe that Soviet

political positions would harden, tensions would increase and the prospect
for reaching agreements to limit strategic arms might be irreparably
damaged."

82

The only viable option appeared to be SALT.

As the summer of 1969 began, Nixon announced his readiness to
begin SALT.

On July 10, Foreign Minister Gromyko delivered an address to

80
Newhouse, pp. lljl-1+3.
Coffey, pp. 57-59* McNamara's quote from Statement of Secre
tary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before a Joint Session of the Senate
Armed Services Committee and the Senate Sub-Committee on Department of
Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1968-72 Defense Program and
Defense Budget, mimeographed "(January 23, 1967)? p. 53) quoted in
Coffey, p. 59*
82

'

"Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace,"
New York Times Magazine February 19, 1970) P* 21+.
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the Supreme Soviet in which herstated that the arms race between the two
great powers was foolish, and that the U.S.S.R. regarded SALT as a
matter of "paramount importance."

On October 25, a joint announcement

proclaimed that SALT was to begin at Helsinki on November 17,1969*
The Talks
Since SALT opened in Helsinki, information about the talks has
been shrouded in secrecy.

This has made it extremely difficult to deter

mine the positions of each nation.

However, ideas of each nation*s

positions can be ascertained.
In a message to Gerard Smith, the chief U^S. delegate to the
negotiations, President Nixon stated the general position for the U.S.
delegation.

He said:
I have stated that for our part we will be
guided by the concept of maintaining "sufficiency"
in the forces required to protect ourselves and
our allies. I recognize that the leaders of the
Soviet Union bear similar defense responsibilities.
I believe it possible, however, that we carry out
our respective responsibilities under a mutually
acceptable limitation and eventual reduction of
our strategic arsenals.®3

Secretary of State Rogers further amplified these instructions
by stating the three main objectives of the United States as:
1) To enhance international security by
maintaining a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic rela
tionship through limitations of the deployment
of strategic armaments.
2) To halt the upward spiral of strategic
arms and avoid the tensions, uncertainties, and
costs of an unrestrained continuation of the
strategic arms race.
3) To reduce the risk of an outbreak of
nuclear war through a dialogue about issues
arising from the strategic situation.
83
•
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Na
tional Security, 2d ed. , Pub. Ij.95 revised Aug. 1973> (Washington: U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1970), p. 7«
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He further stated:

"What we hope that we can do is negotiate an arms

limitation agreement which will keep us in the same relative position
that we are now— and which can be verified."

Pi)

This meant, says Robert Bowie, that the United States1 negotia
ting position involved the need to keep the Triad in effect, including
land-based missiles, SLBMs, and strategic bombers.

85

Moreover, the

objectives for SALT were to be the prevention of any unilateral advantages
to either side, and to insure that a "stable strategic equilibrium"
(under assured destruction) be achieved.
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All in all, said Gerard
Q

Smith, the U.S. delegation was "to see what could be ripe for agreement."
SALT evolved through seven rounds, alternating the place of
meeting between Helsinki and Vienna.

Round I, which opened at Helsinki

on November 17> 19^9» lasted for thirty-five days.

At its conclusion,

/

a communique was issued which stated very little except that "an under
standing was reached on the general range of questions which will be the
subject of further U.S.-Soviet eehanges."

88

The stress in Round I, Newhouse says, was on defining the para
meters of the main, or central, weapon systems.

Moscow appeared to be

very concerned over ABM, much to the surprise of the United States.
Newhouse quotes "a closely involved American" as recalling that "both
sides [were] making McNamara-like noises about the destabilizing effects
of ABM deployment; the Russians were surprisingly explicit on this
8i+Ibid. , p. 8.
85
,
Robert R. Bowie, "The Bargaining Aspects of Arms Control:
SALT Experience," in Kintner, p. 131 •
86
Moulton, p. 302.
88

Quoted in Newhouse, p. 173*

87
Arms Control. . . ., p. 8.
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point." 89

At this round Moscow supposedly offered three alternative

postures for'ABM:

heavy, limited, or no deployment.

"vague and noncommittal."

The U.S. reply was

Quantity was discussed in great detail, "but

both sides "were much less willing to do so about quality— about MIRV's,
improved support systems, and potential innovations."

Furthermore, "the

Russians had clearly been instructed to avoid talking about them at all.
They could discuss numbers of launchers, for example, but not the size
of launchers, or the accuracies of warheads."
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The Russians would

discuss ARM and when the Americans attempted to raise other subjects, the
Soviets would become greatly concerned over the U.S. Forward-Based
Systems (FBS)-.91
Round II of SALT began in Vienna on April 16, 1970*

The United

States hoped that by proposing "very limited ABM deployment," they could
eventually attain a ceiling on Soviet offensive missiles, and especially
a subceiling on the number of SS-9's.

At this round an option was pre-.

sented by the United States delegation which would have banned MIRV.

This

was quickly refused by the U.S.S.R. as it represented an attempt, said a
Russian delegate, to "freeze" Moscow in a technologically inferior posi
tion.

The Russians did, however, quickly accept a United States proposal

for an ABM plan which limited deployment to one site located around each
nation's capital.

This, as the U.S. delegation soon realized, was to

the Soviet's advantage because of the over three hundred ICBM's around
Moscow, which would have come under the protective coverage of their ABM.
^Ibid.

^Newhouse, p. 1?3*

91FBS consists of U.S. aircraft located in continental Europe
and on aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean. These are dual purpose
aircraft, capable of carrying nuclear or non-nuclear bombs. Russia
wanted to count these as central weapons systems.

There were no ICBM's located around Washington.

The United States, says

Newhouse, had not expected the Russians to accept this proposal; -there
fore, it had to retreat and renegotiate its ABM posture.

There were no
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other important results and Round II recessed on August 11+.
Round III began November 2 in Helsinki, and was to last only
forty-six days.
positions.

Here, both nations appeared very far apart in their *

Apparently the major portion of time was spent in defining

what types of weapons should be limited:

offensive, defensive, or both.

The United States wanted limitation on both, while the Soviets would
agree only to limit ABM's.

Very little was resolved at this round, but

a short while after its conclusion a joint statement was released in
both Washington and Moscow on May 20, 1971 stating:
The governments of the United States and
the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course
of their talks on the limitation of strategic
armaments, have agreed to concentrate this
year on working out an agreement for the
limitation of the deployment of antiballistic
missile systems (ABMs). They have also agreed
that, together with concluding an agreement to
limit ABMs , they will agree on certain measures
with respect to the limitation of offensive
strategic weapons.93
As the ABM issue was resolved bit by bit during the succeeding
Rounds, the Soviets agreed to quantitatively limit their ICBM and SLBM
forces for a temporary period.

The main points of the actual negotia

tions, however, were the interest each nation displayed in ABM, and the
reluctance of the Soviets to agree to limit MIRV.
Two agreements were finally reached at SALT I; The ABM Treaty,
■^Newhouse, pp. 177-89*
^^Michael Getler, "U.S. Plan would Limit U.S. ABM if U.S.S.R.
would Freeze SS-9>" The Washington Post, 21 May 1971 > P* A8.
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and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons,
both signed on May 26, 1972.^
The AIM Treaty provides for the deployment of a limited-scale
ABM system, although ABM R & I) is permitted.
"nuclear war would have devastating

The treaty recognizes that

consequences for all mankind," and

therefore a limit on ABM would

be a "substantial factor" in halting, or

limiting a strategic offensive

arms race.

continues, that this agreement

will lead to "further negotiations on

limiting strategic arms."

It is hoped, the treaty

Some of the more important provisions of the

ABM Treaty are as follows.
It prohibits a nationwide deployment of ABM by specifying that
each nation may only defend its "national capital area" and one ICBM
area.

Each nation is limited to 100 launchers at each ABM.site, and

radars are also limited.

Each launcher is limited to one missile which

must be designed for intercept, and the actual ABM system deployed cannot
be made up of any components which are "sea-based, air-based, spacebased, or mobile land-based."
ation of A M components.

Several articles provide for non-prolifer

Any inspections, the treaty further points out,

will be by use of the "national technical means of verification" at each
nation*s disposal.

Furthermore, the treaty is established to be of

"unlimited duration," with either party allowed to withdraw by providing
the other with a six-months notice "if it decides that extraordinary
events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its
supreme interests."
The Interim Agreement provides for a five-year moratorium on the
deployment of strategic offensive weapons; e.g., it acknowledges that
9V i e text of these are from Bupuy, pp. 603-9
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such a limit would temporarily serve to "contribute to the creation of
more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic
arms, as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the
strengthening of trust between States. . • . "It also halts construction,
as of July 1, 1972, on additional land-based ICBM launchers, and it
limits SLBMs to the "numbers operational and under construction" on
May 26, 1972.

The agreement, like the treaty, is to be in force for five

years, unless superseded.

Each party is permitted to withdraw from the

agreement by providing the other with a six-months notice.

The numbers

specified in the agreement are:
(1)

U.S.— no more than 710 SLBMs on no more than 1+2+ submarines.

(2)

U.S.S.R.---no more than 950 SLBMs on no more than 62 sub

marines.
These agreements meant that the U.S.S.R., potentially, could have
561+ ICEMs more than the U.S.:

I,6l8 to l,0f>2+.

This numerical advantage

was allowable, said the U.S. government, because the United States1
ICBM with MIRV was generally regarded as more reliable and accurate.

The

U.S. had 1,000 Minuteman II, but were to MIRV 550 of these (to be called
Minuteman III) with three MIRVs each.

It was expected at the time of

the ratification of the treaty that even with the numerical discrepancy
in launchers, the United States would have almost 2+00 more warheads than
the Soviet Union.

In payload the U.S.S.R. would have an advantage, but

the U.S. planners felt that accuracy was more important.

Many felt that

whenever the U.S.S.R. developed MIRV, the advantages in warheads would be
quickly erased. 95
9E>James M. Roherty, Class Lecture, College of William & Mary in
Virginia, February 21, 1973«
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"Even before the ink was dry," so to speak, both nations were
already executing technological "hedges" against the other.

Whereas

the Soviet’s "hedge" appears to be a MIRV for its land-based missiles,
especially the SS-9 > the United States’ "hedge" appears to resttwith
improvements in its SLBMs.

The latter improvements are an adoption of

the Trident submarine, and a new SLBM to go with it, the underwater longrange missile system (ULMS).

ULMS’ advantage is that its range is

approximately 1}.,500 nautical miles, as compared to the approximate range
of 2,500 nautical miles for Polaris and Poseidon.

The importance of

ULMS, as Newhouse points out, is that it "will increase the operating
area of the submarine by a factor of ten."

96

PART V
Conclusion
The factors contributing to the onset of SALT are numerous and
very complex.

The most important of these could be summarized in the

following manner.
Bureaucratic Influence
It is apparent that the bureaucracies in both nations function to
influence the decision-making processes by shaping the inputs being
funneled into the leadership.

Simply because they have this function,

both bureaucracies did influence the onset of SALT; for example, possibly
in defining when security in the form of parity had been met, or defining
what weapon systems should be limited, or by some other means.

Never

theless, even though the bureaucracies were not decisive, they should not
be disregarded as factors.
96

Newhouse, p. 23.

Even if they did not push for SALT, they did
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define the parameters in such a way that it was seen as a viable option.
Economy
The economy defines the resources a decision-maker has available
to execute policy.

To that extent it affected both nations in the

decision to opt for SALT.

It is doubtful that it was decisive in Russia,

however, because, as Thomas Wolfe says, if it was then one would have
expected the U.S.S.R. to withdraw from SALT as their economy resurged in
1970•

Likewise, if the economy had been particularly influential in the

U.S. decision to enter SALT, the United States probably would have wel
comed the opportunity to halt strategic spending after SALT terminated.
Neither was done.
Perceptions of the International Environment
The international environment provided the setting in which to
conduct SALT, and for that reason, at least, it has to be taken into
consideration.

In the final analysis, unless SALT offered an opportunity

to enhance Russian and U.S. security it would never have begun.

SALT

dealt primarily with security, but even though this is said to be mostly
a political matter, in the nuclear age it becomes quite technical in
nature.

It appears, therefore, that notions of strategic security are

intertwined with the interaction of the international environment and the
strategic-technological-military factor.
Strategic-Technological-Military
This combination of factors was vitally important to the onset
of SALT.

Strategically, security depended on the prescriptions of the

strategic doctrines then in voguej i.e., deterrence

and defense.

Mili

tarily, a nation’s power, and consequently its influence and security,
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is perceived to depend on its military forces.

Technologically, qualita

tive innovations in weaponry affect both strategic and military factors.
Militarily, they add to power, and "exponential" jumps such as MIRV are
looked on with great favor.

Strategically, they are placed into the

schema of the strategic doctrine and are judged as stabilizing or not
by each nation.

If not, then security is harmed and action must be taken.

Qualitatively speaking, the only major "exponential" jumps in
weaponry since World War II have been the atom and hydrogen bombs, the
development of the ICBM, and the development of MIRV.

None, -until MIRV,

caused a SALT because the U.S.S.R. had failed to achieve parity and the
U.S. refused to give up the idea of superiority.

MIRV, on the other

hand, was probably unknown by the Soviet Union until preliminary steps
had already been taken to begin SALT.

The U.S. knew of MIRV, but were

concerned lest the Soviets perfect it for their SS-9*

As the negotiations

began, however, the U.S.S.R. quickly turned down a limit on MIRV, there
fore indicating a desire to retain the opportunity to develop it.
ABM, on the other hand, was the primary interest of SALT. 97
Ironically, this weapon was not regarded as an "exponential" jump in
qualitative innovation because it was composed of older ICBM technology,
and it did not strengthen a nation's offensive power as such.

It did,

however, drastically affect the strategic doctrine of deterrence.

It was

a defensive weapon and there was an excellent possibility that if de
ployed, it would, as McNamara suggested, have precipitated a major ams
race.

Not only would it have been expensive to build, it would also have

created the additional expense incurred in the construction of more
97
' O f the nine options originally created for SALT by the U.S.,
seven were to limit ABM.
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offensive weapons.

It would have adversely affected the economics of

both nations, without increasing security at all.
was made, therefore, to limit ABM.

The political decision

This has been followed by both

powers•
A decision was also made to limit offensive arms, but qualitative
hedges have already been developed:

MIRV for the U.S.S.R. and ULMS for

the U.S.
In the final analysis, all of the above factors influenced SALT
to a degree, but none was decisive.

The most influential, however, were

those which affected security: the strategic-technological-military
factors.

APPENDIX A
The Language of SALT
Since theoretical jargon has influenced the thinking and decisions of the United States policy-makers,

98

it becomes necessary to

devote time to a discussion of the theoretical aspects of deterrence.
In essence, the language of SALT is rooted in the abstract, vague ter
minology of deterrence.

This terminology is a hybrid mix of terms,

including those of a military-strategic, technical, and pyschologicalpolitical nature.
Deterrence is a theory that assumes that parleying with other
actors in the international environment will not be fruitful if a state
is not in the position to make its views a reality to the other party.
Goodwill cannot be relied upon.

The term suggests that the purpose of

arming is to disuade, preclude— -"deter"— conflict.

If one power can

convince a potential adversary that conflict would be more disadvantageous
to the latter, then the issue will not be tested.

There are several

assumptions in the concept which have to be met, namely:
sides are rational in the calculating

(l)

sense of the word; (2)

that both
that a

credible threat is presented, that both sides have the force structure
necessary to impose unacceptable damage on the other side, and that they
both have the will to do so; and (3)

that a stable environment exists

98

The Soviet strategic doctrine is not fully known, although it
is suspected to be somewhat along the same lines as that of the U.S.
This appendix, of necessity, will utilize the U.S. strategic doctrine.
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in which there are no "surprises” of either a political or technological
nature. 99
Deterrence as a strategic-military policy is a paradox in the
sense that its success
depends on essentially psychological criteria.
Deterrence seeks to prevent a given course by
making it seem less attractive than all possible
alternatives. It therefore ultimately depends
on an intangible quality: the state of mind
of the potential aggressor. . . .Deterrence
requires a combination of power, the will to
use it, and the assessment of these by the
potential aggressor.190
In essence, then, strategic stability requires that the great states
know the resources the other has.

It is a fragile notion, which can be

upset by improvements in technology.
The difference between deterrence, as described above, and
defense is central to the strategic discussions in the post-World War II
period.

Glenn H. Snyder in his comparison of the two notions essen

tially agrees with the notion of deterrence as shown a b o v e . D e f e n s e ,
on the other hand, means reducing one’s "own prospective costs and risks
in the event that deterrence fails," by some "defensive" means; e.g.,
a missile defense system, civil defense activities, fortification
(hardening) of one’s own missile sites.

The difference between deterrence

and defense then, can be said to be analogous to the difference in
^^See Eoherty, Fn. 95*
"^^Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New York: Harpers,
1960), p. 12.
^"^Snyder defines deterrence as "discouraging the enemy from taking
military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing
his prospective gain." Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense; Toward
a Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1961), p. 3.
■

"reducing the probability of war and mitigating its consequences.
Snyder, p. 4.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there seem to be certain factors which are
common to the onset of each of the three arms control conferences under
study.

However, the effects of each of them appear to differ according

to the circumstances surrounding the specific negotiation.
Economics
The state of a nation's economy appears to have been a major
determinant of its willingness to enter into arms control negotiations,
especially with regard to the Washington Conference and SALT.

The Hague

Conferences also exhibit this factor as important, but to a lesser
degree.

Before the Czar's Rescript, for example, it appears that Russia

was in financial straits for many reasons, but primarily due to the
costs of maintaining its immense armed forces.

Russia was heavily in

debt to other nations, particularly Prance, and the outlook for future
credit was bleak.

The expected cost of refitting the armed forces with

a new field gun was too high, thus the Czar attempted to reach some sort
of arms control agreement with other continental powers, particularly
Austria-Hungary and Germany.
Granted, there were other powers in the world having financial
problems, but even though it would have been possible for most of them
to use the proposed conference as a vehicle for reducing armaments and
therefore arms budgets, they did not.

Germany, for example, ridiculed
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the idea that arms control was necessary for economic reasons.

More

over, although England recognized that armaments were an expensive pro
position, the financial "burdens were not large enough to bring about
British agreement on arms control.
Furthermore, during the conference, the vast majority of nations
did not appear to be concerned with the economic problems created by
armaments and no concerted effort was made to eliminate any item on
economic grounds.

In the final analysis, if the cost of armaments was a

"crushing burden" driving nations to the Hague, this was not in evidence
in any case but that of Russia.
The economic factor appears to have played a more important role
in the decision to opt for the Washington Conference in 1921.

The

American naval program of 1916, for example, was proving to be a very
expensive proposition.

By 1919-1920 it came to be considered economi

cally infeasible, and ways to reduce naval spending without harming
security were discussed.

One viable option was the conference.

Japan was having similar, and possibly more severe, financial
problems.

Her buildup of naval weaponry appears to have been tied to

the United States1 1916 naval program.

Her attempt to stay at two-

thirds the level of American naval construction, however, was placing
her near bankruptcy.

Moreover, appropriations were becoming more diffi

cult to obtain from the Diet, and articulate opinion pushed for financial
relief.

Great Britain was also in financial straits.

World War I had

caused the British to incur massive debts, and on top of these, post-war
domestic expenses were astronomical.

Finally, financial problems

became so severe that the decision was made to place a very large portion
of the British fleet on reserve status.

This concern over financial
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problems was to continue into the negotiations, and the main agreements
finally reached limited the most expensive type of vessel— -the capital
ship.
The actual effect of economics on the Russian decision to enter
into SALT is probably unknowable, at least to Western analysts, but it
does appear to have been a factor.

The fact that the decision to nego

tiate was made during a year when defense spending had reached its
highest peak and the economy was in a severe downturn, however, is
coincidence enough to suggest a probable correlation.

Likewise, the fact

that the Soviets decided to stay in the negotiations as their economy
resurged in 1970 probably indicates that finances were not a decisive
factor.
The decision of the United States to enter into SALT probably
was influenced heavily by economics.

The war in Vietnam, among other

things, had caused the defense budgets to soar after 1965, a -fa-ct which
became painfully obvious as major, vocal disagreements on spending
priorities erupted in 1967.

Arguments appeared to center around whether

to spend money on either "guns” or "butter."

As Congress began to

become more concerned with defense spending, the executive branch turned
to ways of economizing.

One such way was an attempt to halt the prolif

eration of strategic weaponry.

This was done by placing a unilateral,

quantitative ceiling on offensive missiles in 1967, the decision to
deploy a "thin" ABM system, and the decision to halt ABM, or limit it to
a severe degree (twelve sites were originally planned) through

SALT.

In the final analysis, economics played a different but major
role in each of the three conferences studied.

At the Hague it was
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influential for Russia, though not for other nations*

At the Washington

Conference it played a large role, at least with respect to Japan, Great
Britain, and the United States, the three great naval powers.
also had a major influence on SALT.

Economics

Here, both nations apparently

wished to divert funds to domestic needs, at least on a temporary basis,
hence agreement was reached on a potentially expensive item— the ABM.
'Qualitative Innovations in Weaponry
Qualitative innovations in weaponry appears to be a common
variable at the conferences.

A factor in the onset of Hague, for

example, was the existence of a new type of field gun.

Russia, until

then the strongest military power on the Continent, saw that possession
of this weapon was vital to its continued well being.

Because of Russia’s

financial status, however, it was felt that this innovation could not be
purchased, thus leaving Russia in a qualitatively inferior status.

The

invention of this weapon, its desirability and its cost, appear to have
been major influences on the Czar's decision to issue his first call for
an arms control conference.
The original Rescript, however, was greeted with skepticism from
the other nations of the world.

Those nations Which were not continental

powers showed little, if any, concern over the existence of the new field
gun, or any other qualitative advance in weaponry for that matter.

There

fore, they were under no "urgent need" to procure such a weapon for
themselves and they remained skeptical of the Czar's motives.

The contin

ental powers likewise felt that the Czar's motives were selfish, and
they saw that the Rescript was the result of Russia's financial problems.
Their original skepticism was ameliorated somewhat by the issuance of a
second circular, however, and the nations did gather at the Hague to
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discuss, among other things, arms control.
Although arms control proposals were presented at the conference
by the Russians, it soon became quite clear that no major agreements were
to occur.

Only the peripheral agreements described in Chapter II were

reached, and none of these were of especially great consequence.

In

essence, once the conference convened, it quickly showed that the nations
of the world were not then ready to conscientiously seek arms control.
The rejection of arms control as part of the 1907 conference's program
only served to emphasize this point.
Two major qualitative innovations in weaponry came into promi
nence during or immediately after World War I, however, and both influ
enced the decision of the major participants, Great Britain, Japan, and
the United States, to enter into negotiations on arms control at the
Washington Conference of 1921-1922. These innovations were the sub
marine and the airplane.
The submarine had shown its potential as a devastating weapons
system in World War I.

Its killing power may not have been as great as

that of a capital ship, but its stealth, quickness, and economy were
adequate compensations.

It was an excellent weapon, both offensively

and defensively, and was being promoted as a revolutionary new concept:
—
one which made a large capital-ship navy an unnecessary extravagance.
The airplane was another weapon with immense potential as both
an offensive and defensive weapon.

It was not as advanced as the sub

marine, and therefore had not had the same impact, but it had shown
promise during the war, and post-war tests had shown its probable future
effectiveness.

The airplane could be constructed very inexpensively,

particularly compared to the capital ship.

li+O

The existence of these two weapon systems provided the oppor
tunity for the nations to keep up both their offensive and defensive
strength at relatively little cost.

Though the submarine and airplane

were not as formidable as the capital ship, they could provide adequate,
and far less expensive, security for each nation.
In the final analysis, however, exactly how much effect these
weapon systems had on the advent of the Washington Conference is in
doubt.

Both were discussed at the Washington Conference, with the

largest controversy centered around the submarine.

It must be noted,

however, that the submarine was a weapon ideally suited for a defensive
as well as offensive role, and those nations without extremely powerful
navies, like Prance, would have no part in Its abolition.

They saw

Britain's offer to abolish the submarine, therefore, as working in her
own favor, especially since she was assured of the second largest fleet
of warships in the world.

To limit capital ships and not submarines, on

the other hand, would bring Britain closer to the lesser powers in naval
strength.

It can be said, then, that Britain's offer to abolish the

submarine showed that she was not prepared to use it as an alternative
to the capital ship, and that, for Britain at least, the factor of quali
tative weapons innovations may not have been of prime importance.

If,

however, Great Britain knew the offer to abolish the submarine would be
refused and that therefore the gesture was made only to induce Prance to
vote for the Root resolutions, then it was effective.

The sudden improve

ments in Britain's submarine forces following the Washington Conference
may show the latter as the case.

For the most part, however, qualitative

advances in weaponry were not a decisive factor in the decisions to enter
into the Washington Conference.

lljl
After World War II, weapons technology changed in rapid,
"exponential" jumps.

This meant that, relative to the interwar period,

qualitative improvements now came about in quick succession.

These

improvements, in turn, were of such magnitude, either in terms of fire
power or delivery capability, that they altered the strategic status quo
in some form.

Thus, the reaction of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. was to

match the innovation, thereby perpetuating an "arms race" until both
sides finally decided to accept parity as a basis for negotiation.

There

fore, it can be said that these qualitative advances in weaponry affected
the onset of SALT.
To digress for a moment, it appears that military technology
creates a particular hazard for any arms control negotiation:
its timing.

it affects

Because of technological innovations, one nation may be a

distance (in the R & I) spectrum) ahead of another at any specific point
in time.

For example, in January 19&7 > President Johnson proposed SALT

to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin.

At that time, however, the United

States was well ahead of the U.S.S.R. in both the number and quality of
strategic arms.

The U.S.S.R. was in the midst of a build-up program

designed to attain equality with the United States.

By June 1968, when

Foreign Minister Gromyko signaled Soviet agreement to SALT, Soviet
strategic production was rapidly catching up with the United States
forces, then at their 19&7 ceiling.
Finally, technological improvements allowed the Soviet Union to
achieve quantitative parity in payload, at least, with the United States
by 1970*

By that date, the Soviet Union was able to absorb a sizeable

counterforce attack and still have enough nuclear weapons left to destroy
the United States.
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It appears, then, that qualitative innovations destabilize an
existing strategic balance— a status quo which is understood, and has
led to plans and policies designed with it in mind.

When an innovation,

such as ABM or MIRV, creates instabilities in strategic thinking, fear
and tension are the result.
The qualitative, or "technological," implication of weaponry
in the nuclear age, then, is that each "exponential" jump dramatically
alters the existing strategic status quo.

If the Soviets are outdone,

as in the case of MIRV, an agreement to limit it is impossible, at least
until both nations have the innovation.
complicated.

Its possession can be hidden, and without on-site inspec

tion it cannot be verified*
is ludicrous.

However, the case of MIRV is

To limit MIRV without inspection guaranteed

ABM, on the other hand, is a destabilizng weapon like

MIRV,-but it can be inspected by satellite reconnaissance and hence
limited.

It is unstable because it limits deterrence; that is, it

allows one side to feel that if it builds enough ABM, then it can win a
nuclear war.

Deterrence depends on a "standoff" where both sides are

equally vulnerable.

To have ABM on both sides would mean that emphasis

would have to be in two areas, in a large, expensive ABM force to pro
vide defense, and a large, expensive offensive force to overcome an
opponent’s ARM system.
What this means, in the final analysis, is that arms control is
based on security, not economics or technological innovations.

Only when

a power feels secure at its force level can negotiations take place.

It

appears that the Soviet Union felt secure only in a position of strategic
parity, where the strategic force structure was stable.
to this, could be limited, and hence the agreement.

ABM was a threat
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Security
It appears that all arms control negotiations in this study were
undertaken to advance security.

In all three cases, the development of

new weaponry altered the then existing strategic status quo, thus
affecting the then prevalent notions of security.

In the case of the

Hague, the field gun affected Russia’s ability to defend itself,
especially under the old rules of warfare where nations massed their
armies.

A new gun would bring murderous concentrations of firepower to

bear on an enemy, thus forcing military commanders to recognize that
deciding combat power on a battlefield, all else being equal, would have
to favor those having this weapon.
became quite insecure.

The "have not”— Russia in this case—

Since it wanted the weapon but could not afford

it, Russia opted for a conference.
At Washington, the existence of the submarine and airplane
changed the then prevalent manner of waging war, on the sea at least,
because it began to make capital ships anachronistic.

Security was not

that severely hurt, however, by the existence of these new weapons.
Instead, the interaction of the three great powers in the Pacific
created security problems for all three.
for Japan, however.

The problem appeared greatest

Japan knew it could not win in any war with the

United States, and it was becoming bankrupt over arms expenditures.

In

addition, the British were making inquiries which led the Japanese to
believe that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was soon to be abrogated.

With

out some agreement to control arms, Japan would have had to enter an
arms race to protect its security, which would have proven to be devas
tating.

The same reasoning existed for Great Britain and the United

States, but to a lesser degree.
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Security was also a prime consideration at SALT,
doctrine of deterrence deals specifically with security.

The entire
If deterrence

fails,then security is irrevocably damaged because a nuclear war has
already begun.

Once both nations become convinced of the destabilizing

effects of ABM on deterrence, then both nations moved to limit its use.
Through a study of these conferences, several things become
apparent.

One is that agreement in the matter of armaments is possible

when there is mutual interest in reaching an agreement, and security
policies are parallel.

If security policies collide, as was the case of

Russia and the United States until the mid-1960s, negotiations cannot be
undertaken.

As John Newhouse aptly states, "arms control becomes a

serious matter only when directly linked to national security."^
Another similarity in the conferences was that in two of the
three, a decision was made by at least one major participant to go from
a formerly superior position in armaments to one of parity with at least
one other nation.

The decision was also made by a nation: formerly

seeking superiority to resign itself to acceptance of parity.
Before the Washington Conference, Great Britain had enjoyed a
superior position in terms of naval power for at least a century, possi
bly more.

Yet, after World War I, it decided to "hold the line" with

regard to further naval expansion, thus conceding the opportunity for the
United States, at least, to achieve a position of equal strength if so
desired.

The United States, on the other hand, had seemingly made a

commitment to achieve naval superiority in its own right.

By 1921,

however, the United States began to abandon this goal, especially as the
^John Newhouse, Cold Dawn:
Rinehart & Winston, 1973)> p. 69.

The Story of SALT (New York: Holt,
'
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British reduced naval construction and the expenses necessary to attain
this "superior” navy became apparent.

Consequently, both nations

resigned themselves to a position of what they perceived as parity in
naval power.

These political decisions thus paved the way for the

negotiations to take place.
The post-World War II period saw a similar occurrence.

The

United States, after its atomic monopoly period had ended in 191*9*.
had resolved to maintain superiority in nuclear weaponry.

This it was

able to do, in both size and quality of nuclear forces, for a long time.
In the 1960s, however, the U.S. dropped the desire for numerical advan
tage in all aspects of the Triad, especially in ICBMs, and decided to
opt for quantitative equality, thereby resting its security on perceptions
of a vast qualitative advantage in weaponry.

This decision allowed the

Soviets to gain numerical equality, then superiority, in terms of
launchers, by default.

This superiority was supposedly balanced,

however, by the somewhat fuzzy nuclear conceptions of the "balancing"
qualitative superiority of the U.S., specifically because of the existence
of MIRV.

In any regard, it was only after this decision to hold the

line on deployment of weaponry that the negotiations were able to take
place.
In essence, it appears that parity defined as a nation’s percep
tion of what constitutes strategic equality, is possibly a necessary
precondition for negotiations to take place.

The "successful" negotia

tions (in the sense of those where the participants gathered in good
faith with some hope of success) , appear to have this in common.
In the final analysis, at the present time it cannot be general
ized that any single factor or combination of factors provide the impetus

for arms control negotiations.

All that can be said is that four factors

are usually present as "influencers" in the decision to enter into arms
control negotiations.

These, in sum, are economic considerations,

qualitative innovations in weaponry, the acquiescence by the major
participants of perceived parity, and the consideration of enhancement
of security.

In actuality the last three pertain to security considera

tions, therefore, it is possible to state that security is the most
important factor in bringing about arms control negotiations, and this
must be recognized in any attempt to solve the political problems
through arms control.

Qualitative advances in weaponry are a prime

determinant of security because they upset the status quo, thereby
challenging decision makers either to match the improvement, or to attempt
arms control to avert an aims race. Thus, qualitative advances in
weaponry always have the potential to create negotiations, but their
actual effect can be known only to the decision maker.
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